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ABSTRACT 
 
Title of Dissertation: The implementation of port state control under the Maritime Labour 
Convention, 2006 
 
Degree:                           MSc 
 
This dissertation aims to examine the difference of legal grounds in relation to Port State 
Control (PSC) between the Conventions under the auspice of IMO and ILO and investigate 
the influence of the Maritime Labour Convention, 2006 (MLC) on the shipping industry. This 
dissertation focuses on finding out the weaknesses of seafarers’ living and working 
environments under the MLC and ILO No. 147 Convention related to the PSC data 
conducted by the Paris MoU and the Tokyo MOU during a three-year interval before and 
after 2013, which was the year entered into force the MLC.  
This study pinpoints that, although the “innovative measures” of the MLC with respect to 
the ILO Conventions provide the right of port states to inspect foreign vessels in their ports, 
the “flexibility” of the MLC granting national discretions could lead into reluctant PSC 
inspections since the national requirements are contradictory to the principle of the 
inspection based on internationally agreed rules.  
The analysis compares the data of both MOUs through the relationship with ship type, age, 
gross tonnage, deficiency and detention for two periods and reveals that the deficiencies of 
the Tokyo MOU increased by 71.8 percent in three years after 2013 compared to those of 
before 2013, while the ones of the Paris MoU slightly decreased during that period. However, 
the number of detentions increased in both MOUs. The analysis also shows that the MLC, 
supported by the “police power” of PSC, would bring a positive effect to the improvement of 
seafarers’ living and working conditions, which will consequently contribute to the safety of 
ships and shipping.  
 
KEYWORDS: Port State Control (PSC), Maritime Labour Convention (MLC), ILO No. 147 
Convention, Paris MoU, Tokyo MOU 
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 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background   
 
It is a traditional and well recognized principle of international maritime law that the State 
whose flag the ship flies has the jurisdiction of enforcement regime over that ship. It is clearly 
stated in Article 94 of the United Nations Convention on the Laws of the Sea, 1982 
(UNCLOS) that a flag state shall effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in 
administrative, technical and social matters over its ships.  
In an effort to deal with the continuing problem of ships loss, the British parliament 
adopted the Loadline requirements in 1906, which was officially applied to all ships including 
foreign vessels visiting British ports and triggered the interventionism at the national level to 
other major maritime nations (Boisson, 1999). However, like the history of making new 
maritime conventions and regulations, things were significantly changed after the tragic 
accident of Titanic in 1912. The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 
(SOLAS), 1914, which was the first regulatory international convention in the maritime safety 
domain, initially enacted the legal ground for the control of foreign vessels by a port state. 
Since that legal instrument did not enter into force because of the World War I, the first 
effective instrument on port state’s right to control foreign vessels calling in its ports is 
associated with the SOLAS 1929 (IMO, 2011; Ozcayir, 2004).  
The Torrey Canyon accident off the western coast of Cornwall, the United Kingdom, in 
1969, paved the way for coastal states towards acquiring the right to intervene with foreign 
ships in their ports or outside their territorial water actively to prevent damage caused by the 
ships’ failures. This trend led to strengthen port states’ power under Article 6 of the 
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 1973, as modified by the 
Protocol of 1978 relating to thereto (MARPOL) and Articles 218 and 219 of the UNCLOS. 
However, the right of the port state under these Articles relates only about the protection of 
the marine environment aspects and is interpreted not to have direct grounds of inspecting 
on safety issues (Boisson, 1999; Ehlers, 2017). This drawback of the UNCLOS on Port State 
Control (PSC) of safety matters might be complimented by the SOLAS 1974.  
Meanwhile, to tackle the issue of substandard vessels effectively, the idea of cooperating 
among neighboring countries or at the regional level on PSC inspection was put forward. 
Thus, PSC has emerged as a safety net for counteracting the misconduct and negligence of 
flag states and classification societies, which have the primary responsibility on ship’s safety.   
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The origin of regional PSC regime was the Memorandum of Understanding among eight 
North Sea States1 signed in the Hague (Hague MOU) in 1978, which had the aim to 
cooperate with PSC inspections on the Merchant Shipping (Minimum Standards) Convention, 
1976 (ILO No. 147 Convention) (Ozcayir, 2004). A high public press in Western Europe 
society caused by the massive oil spill of Amoco Cadiz in March 1978 pushed stricter 
surveillance of port states over foreign vessels and, consequently, expanded its members 
and inspection areas leading to establish the Paris Memorandum of Understanding on Port 
State Control (Paris MoU) in 1982 by 14 European countries2 (Ozcayir, 2004; Paris MoU, 
2016a).  
Noting that there are limitations of flag state’s enforcement related to the shipping 
industry’s nature and that a regional PSC MOU is an adequate safety net to control 
substandard ships, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) encouraged establishing a 
regional PSC MOU and cooperating among member authorities and between MOUs.  
It is also necessary to consider the Maritime Labor Convention (MLC), which was 
adopted in 2006 and took effect on the twentieth August 2013 under the auspices of the 
International Labour Organization (ILO) in cooperation with the IMO. The MLC, as a “bill of 
rights” for seafarers, became the “fourth pillar” in the maritime sector with the traditional parts 
of safety, environment protection and seafarers training and certification represented by the 
SOLAS, MARPOL and the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification 
and Watchkeeping for Seafarers 1978 (STCW) respectively (Baldauf, Dalaklis, & Kataria, 
2016; Durler, 2010; Lavelle, 2014).  
While the MLC is expected to lead towards “the universality of application and the level 
playing field” for the shipping industry mainly through PSC inspection of no more favourable 
treatment, this Convention describes a level of “flexibility”, to allow its member states to 
exercise their discretion by legislating international regulations into their national laws and 
regulations (McConnell, Devlin, & Doumbia-Henry, 2011). For instance, the definition of 
“night” work and the “types of jeopardizing work” for seafarers under the age of 18 according 
to Standard A1.1 shall be defined or determined by national laws or regulations. While this 
discretion would lead its member states to lessen the burden of implementation and to adopt 
it speedily, it would act as an adverse effect to conduct PSC inspections because PSC 
officers do not deeply know the national rules concerned and have difficulties to correctly 
interpret them within the limited inspection time. 
                                               
1 Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany (Federal Republic of), the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and 
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland  
2 Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain,  Sweden and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
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Additionally, there are not many studies about how to evaluate the effect of the 
Convention and what areas the Convention has regarding the weaknesses in respect of its 
implementation. Considering that the PSC inspection data is a reliable source, as one of the 
most accurate and objective indicators among several related data available, to appraise the 
performance of international maritime conventions, it is worthy at the time of three years 
after the effectuation of the MLC to evaluate its effect through the analysis on the PSC data. 
 
1.2 Objectives of the study 
 
The analysis in hand will investigate the difference of legal aspects between the IMO and 
ILO Conventions on seafarers and broadly discuss the impacts of the MLC on the shipping 
industry and seafarers’ working environment. Additionally, it will study the outcome of the 
PSC inspections between the MLC and the ILO No. 147 Convention, which is another labour 
convention effective before the effectuation of the MLC.  
The analysis in hand will also examine the flexibility of flag states’ discretion in the 
regulations of the MLC, which may cause disagreements among PSC officers or even 
between a Flag state and a Port state, or reluctance in conducting PSC inspection. This 
research will examine the effect of the MLC on the seafarers’ working environment based on 
analyzing the PSC inspection data, mainly in relation to the Paris MoU and the 
Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control in the Asia-Pacific region (Tokyo 
MOU), on the ground of these questions.  
Based on the results, it will try to identify the drawbacks of the MLC in implementing PSC 
as well as the associated weak areas. The study will seek further improvements to address 
the limitations on the MLC regulations. It is hoped thereby that this study will help the 
shipping industry and competent authorities to implement the Convention with the wider 
understanding on the weak parts of implementing the MLC in terms of the PSC and take 
corrective actions thereto.  
 
1.3 Scope of the study 
 
The research will examine the right of port states empowered by the ILO Conventions on 
seafarers, which contain different requirements; it will also carry out analysis for the PSC 
inspection data on seafarers’ living and working conditions collected by the Tokyo MOU 
and the Paris MoU. The data will analyze and compare each area by the ship’s age, type, 
gross tonnage, nature of deficiency and detention for two groups of 3 years before and after 
2013, which is the MLC effectuated, between the records of the two regional PSC regimes. 
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The research will identify the difference of deficiencies pointed out by port authorities of 
both MOUs between the ILO No. 147 Convention and the MLC, as well as the weak part of 
the MLC in terms of PSC inspection.  
 
1.4 Literature review 
 
Titz (1989) supported that PSC is an effective tool in protecting environmental pollution 
via an analysis of 4.5 years’ PSC inspection data at the very beginning of the Paris MoU. 
The analysis showed that as a ship gets older the deficiencies related to environmental 
matters are increasing and that PSC works as a tool to detect a potential polluter.  
Stewart (1990) elaborated on the background of PSC and, especially, the structure and 
inspection procedure of the Paris MoU and the United States Coast Guard (USCG). The 
author examined the legal aspect of PSC that relates to Flag States, mostly open registry, 
which do not have enough administrative power to monitor and control their fleet whether 
they comply with international and national regulations or not. Another legal issue raised by 
the author was the civil liability of a shipowner or carrier and the liability of the Port State for 
loss of a carrier as a result of unduly detention. 
Bo (2006) examined various articles of the MLC and the obligation of contraction 
governments, including a port state. He researched to identify which area should be 
improved to obtain the objective of the Convention in terms of the national level of China.  
Mejia (2005) reviewed the performances criteria for the International Safety Management 
Code (ISM Code) by the analysis of PSC data, inspected by the Swedish Maritime 
Administration, comparing the deficiencies rate and detentions rate of different ship types 
between two periods; the first phase for pre-implementing the ISM Code and the second 
phase for post-implementing ISM Code. Although there were no significant trends, the 
author provided the observation that the analysis of PSC data suggested that the ISM Code 
gave positive impact on a ship’s safety.  
 Veganaden (2007) examined the influences to the working conditions of seafarers by 
the implementation of MLC at the point of flag states, shipowners and ship crews. The 
author demonstrated that the compliance of the Convention greatly depended on the PSC 
and emphasized the harmonization and cooperation approach at the regional MOU level to 
tackle substandard vessels that were not complying with the Convention.  
Jeon (2016) studied the missing or inadequate clauses of Korean national law compared 
to those of MLC in respect to the implementation of PSC. The author pointed out the 
limitation of PSC officers when dealing with some issues of Article III of MLC regarding the 
freedom of association, right of collective bargaining and elimination of all forms of forced or 
compulsory labour, which had not expressly stipulated their definition, application and 
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enforcement into the regulations or Code. He suggested that the national law would be 
supplemented for the detailed PSC inspection procedure and onshore complaint handling 
procedures. 
  Lee (2016) examined the effectiveness of the ISM Code by analyzing PSC deficiencies 
of the Tokyo MOU and non-conformities of the ISM audit for Korean vessels. It observed 
that the PSC influenced more effectively to improve some limited parts like emergency 
preparedness, maintenance and documentation in a short period while ISM worked in the 
long term to improve a ship’s safety management system. The author stressed that the 
“police power” of PSC with the cooperation of regional authorities provided a string motive 
for shipping companies and seafarers to maintain their vessels in good condition at all 
times to prevent a detention by a port state.        
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 PORT STATE CONTROL 
 
2.1 The legal grounds of PSC 
 
 Legal foundation in SOLAS 
The primary responsibility of a ship’s safety belongs to the shipowners and the flag state 
who should take proper measures to ensure that ships flying its flag comply with generally 
agreed international standards on ship’s equipment, structure, manning and crew 
competence according to Article 94 of UNCLOS. In practice, many flag states entrust their 
authority to a Recognized Organization (RO) for inspections and issuing certificates to their 
fleet according to the relevant rules including Regulation 6 and 12 of Chapter I of SOLAS 
and Regulation 6 and 7.2 of Annex I of MARPOL. However, the overall responsibility of the 
certificates issued by ROs still remains within the Administration of the flag state.  
It is not a simple event for a port state or coastal state to inspect or investigate foreign 
vessels in their territory, since a vessel has been considered by international customary 
laws as a “moving territory” of the flag state that the ship is registered. Because of 
increasing international trading and calls of foreign ships in their ports and coastal waters, 
the need for coastal and port states to control the foreign vessels was created. The first 
outcome of these trends was Article 61 of the SOLAS 1914 that states: 
              
Every ship holding a Safety Certificate issued by the officers of the Contracting State to 
which it belongs, or by persons duly authorised by that State, is subject in the ports of 
the other Contracting States to control by officers duly authorized by their 
Governments in so far as this control is directed towards verifying that there is on 
board a valid Safety Certificate, and, if necessary, that the conditions of the vessel’s 
seaworthiness correspond substantially with the particulars of that certificates ; that is 
to say, so that the ship can proceed to sea without danger to the passengers and the 
crew. (Boisson, 1999) 
 
It is evaluated as a “pioneering approach” to the legal aspect of allowing port states’ 
intervention to the territorial power of a flag state that dominated at that time, considering 
the clauses having a similar effect came to appear in MARPOL and STCW in 1970s. Even 
though the Convention was not introduced because of the outbreak of World War I, its 
intention was succeeded by the Article 54 of the SOLAS 1929, which became effective in 
1933. The Article had similar expressions to its predecessor, only adding by the following 
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sentence: ”In the event of this control giving rise to intervention if any kind, the officer 
carrying out the control shall forthwith inform the Consul of the country in which the ship is 
deemed to be necessary.” This article was incorporated into regulation 19 of Chapter I of 
SOLAS 1974 through SOLAS 1948 and SOLAS 1960. 
Additionally, Regulation 4 of Chapter 11-1 of SOLAS describes the PSC operational 
requirements. The PSC officers may ask for demonstrations and evaluate ship crew’s 
familiarizations on essential procedures on board such as firefighting and lifeboat launching 
under the regulations.  Furthermore, Regulation 6.2 of Chapter IX and Regulation 9 of 
Chapter 11-2 of SOLAS on PSC significantly contribute to better quality levels of a ship’s 
safety and security.   
 
 Legal grounds in MARPOL 
Owing to the global industrialization after the Second World War, the growth of seaborne 
trade from the 1950s drastically increased during the next 50 years with an average annual 
growth rate of about five percent compared to only nearly two percent annual growth rate 
for the previous 50 years since 1900 (Ma, 2016). This trend attracted many new ships into 
the shipping industry, but unfortunately a substantial number of accidents was also 
recorded. The world merchant fleet multiplied 2.63 times during 15 years: from 82.7 million 
gross tonnages in 1955 to 217.9 million gross tonnages in 1970. Remarkably, oil tankers 
expanded their gross tonnage by about 3.25 times during the period (UNCTAD, 1971).  
To prevent ship-based pollution, the International Convention for the Prevention of 
Pollution of the Sea by Oil, 1954 (OILPOL) was adopted and entered into force in 1958. 
Although the Convention regulated the discharge of oil or oily mixtures from machinery 
spaces or cargo tank, the Convention had no clauses of inspection and certification by a 
flag state. The power of a port state in their territory under this convention is only inspecting 
the respective oil record book according to its Article IX.  
Serious marine accidents were associated with the expansion of the world merchant fleet 
and open registries of providing more economic and administrative benefits to shipowners 
(Mukherjee, Brownrigg, Xu, & Mejia, 2013). Especially, a series of pollution incidents 
occurred in European and the United States waters by Liberian oil tankers, such as the 
Torrey Canyon in 1967, Ocean Eagle in 1968, Argo Merchant in 1976 and Amoco Cadiz in 
1978, which promoted the notion of enforcing stricter PSCs and strengthening the port 
state’s power. Further, OILPOL, despite of the amendments in 1962, 1969 and 1971, 
largely allowed discharging ballast water contaminated in cargo tanks and proved 
inadequate to protect the marine environment (Boisson, 1999; Kasoulides, 1993; IMO, 
n.d.a).  
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Another drawback of OILPOL compared to its successor or SOLAS 1948, which was a 
contemporary convention on ship safety area, is that the Convention provided the legal 
grounds only for a flag state intervention, not for port states. To remedy the legal 
shortcomings of OILPOL and to strengthen the flag states’ responsibility and port states’ 
jurisdiction, IMO adopted the MARPOL Convention in 1973. This Convention introduced the 
“survey and certification system” by a flag state for ship’s equipment and structure including 
oil filtering system and segregated ballast tank that is independent from cargo tank. Articles 
5(2) and 6(2) of the Convention also empowered port states of its contracting parties to 
exercise the right of inspection to a ship calling at their ports or terminals. The Convention 
was modified by the Protocol in 1978, so called MARPOL 73/78, which became effective in 
1983.  
The MARPOL Convention consists of independent Annexes that regulate different 
polluters of oil, noxious liquid substances, harmful substances, sewages, garbage and air 
pollutants. Therefore, each Annex has the grounds of PSC on operational requirement 
under Regulation 11 of Annex I, Regulation 16.9 of Annex II, Regulation 9 of Annex III, 
Regulation 14 of Annex IV, Regulation 9 of Annex V and Regulation 10 of Annex VI.  
 
 Legal grounds in the Load line Convention 
Despite some measures such as the recommendation of limiting loading cargoes by the 
Lloyds Register in 1835, many accidents still happened until the middle of the 19th century 
in the world. For instance, there were 1,313 shipwrecks in 1867.  The first rule setting 
minimum freeboard for merchant vessels was recorded via the British Merchant Shipping 
Act of 1876 (Boisson, 1999; Ventura, n.d).  
The first International Convention on Load Lines (ICLL) was adopted in 1930 in order to, 
as stated in its Preamble, “promote of life and property at sea by establishing in common 
agreement uniform principles and rules”. The Convention aims to secure minimum reserve 
buoyance for safeguard by limiting maximum quantity of cargoes on board (Boisson, 1999). 
The limitations, the so called Plimsoll mark, are indicated amidships on both side hulls with 
seasonal and maritime regional freeboards.  
Ships engaged in international voyages are required to hold a relevant certificate after 
the survey of their flag states and subject to control by the port state according to Article 16 
of the Convention. This convention was succeeded by ICLL 1966, which entered into force 
in 1968; the right of PSC is affirmed by Article 21 of the new Convention.  
 
 Legal grounds in the Tonnage Measurement Convention 
The International Convention on Tonnage Measurement of Ships (Tonnage Convention) 
was adopted in 1969 to unify a diverse tonnage measurement system of each state for 
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merchant ships and entered into force in 1982. Although the Tonnage Convention itself 
does not deal with safety or environmental issues, Article 12 of the Convention provides the 
reference of PSC as the Convention is important for PSC activities. The Convention defines 
a ship’s gross tonnage that is the criteria whether or not the ship applies to the specific 
regulations of SOLAS, MARPOL and STCW.  
 
 Legal grounds in STCW Convention  
To achieve the minimum competency of seafarers and unify different standards on 
certification, training and education for seafarers by each state, IMO adopted the STCW 
Convention in 1978, which entered into force in 1984. According to Article X of the 
Convention, PSC officers are given the right to verify that seafarers on board hold the 
relevant Certificates of Competency or Endorsement and other certificates for basic training, 
familiarization training and special training for certain types of ship and equipment on board.   
On the other hand, the 1995 amendment to the STCW Convention contained distinctive 
requirements to impose more obligations on flag states compared to other Conventions 
under the auspices of IMO. A flag state is required to conduct an evaluation by an outside 
organization for its quality standards on their certification system, training courses, 
programs, examination and qualification of instructors and assessors at intervals of not 
more than five years according to Regulation I/8. 
Another requirement for flag states is to provide to IMO detailed information on its 
administrative measures, including the evaluation of quality standards, on how to assure its 
national system to fulfill the conventional requirements full and complete effect according to 
Regulation I/7. After reviewing the information of flag states by panels of competent 
persons, IMO produces a list of “confirmed parties”, the so called “white list”, which 
complies the Convention (Boisson, 1999; IMO, n.d.b). 
 
 Legal grounds in UNCLOS 
The UNCLOS, as “a constitution for the oceans”, was adopted at the third United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea (third Conference) in 1982 after nearly a 20-year long 
discussion. UNCLOS takes into account all the legal aspects of the ocean space over 
serious conflicts between two opposing fundamental principles, i.e. territorial sovereignty 
and freedom of the seas (Bernaerts, 1988). The Convention incorporated customary 
international law and four 1958 Conventions3. 
                                               
3 They are the Convention of Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, the Convention of High Seas, the 
Convention of Continental Shelf and the Convention of Fishing and Conservation of the Living 
Resources of the High Seas. 
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While every state has the exclusive right to sail its ships on the high seas, it has several 
obligations to exercise its jurisdiction and control over the ships according to Article 94 of 
UNCLOS. More specifically, flag states should take relevant measures on ship registration, 
securing a ship’s safety at sea including the survey and crew qualifications and marine 
casualty investigation in respect of administrative, technical and social matters concerning 
the ships. Furthermore, Article 211(2) and Article 217 of the Convention requires that flag 
states should ensure their vessels to comply with applicable international rules and 
standards on enactment, survey, certification and control over violation in respect to the 
prevention of pollution of the marine environment.   
On the other hand, a port state is given the power to establish particular requirements to 
prevent and control marine pollution from foreign vessels calling their ports under Article 
211(3) of UNCLOS. Additionally, Article 218 and 219 of UNCLOS describe the right of port 
states to investigate or inspect foreign vessels called their ports to protect marine 
environment. While Article 219 states administrative measures to prevent environmental 
threats that may be caused by violation of international standards on a ship’s 
seaworthiness, Article 218 defines the jurisdiction of port states in respect of an illegal 
discharge from a vessel.  
 
 The legal grounds in Anti Fouling Convention  
Most ships have been applying anti-fouling coating of paints to the hull to prevent or 
reduce attached organisms by slowly leeching the compounds of paint or killing barnacles 
and other marine lives. However, the paints may contain harmful substances for the marine 
eco system (IMO, n.d.c). For the purpose of regulating ecologically harmful substances in 
anti-fouling system, the International Convention on the Control of Harmful Anti-fouling 
Systems on Ships (AFS) was adopted in 2001.  
Even though the AFS convention became effective on 17 September 2008, the 
application, re-application or use of harmful anti-fouling systems to all ships has been 
prohibited since 1 January 2003 and ships do not bear such compounds on their hull or 
external surface since 1 January 2008 according to Article 4 and Annex 1 of the Convention. 
The Convention requires ships of 400 gross tonnages and above, engaged in international 
voyages, to hold an International Anti-fouling System Certificate issued by ship’s flag state4.  
                                               
4 If a ship of 24 meters or more in length, but less than 400 gross tonnages, is engaged in 
international voyages, the ship should carry a Declaration signed by the owner or owner authorized 
agent according to Regulation 5 of Annex 4 of the Convention. 
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Port states can inspect a ship calling in their ports whether the ship complies to the 
Convention or not by Article 11 of the Convention. If non-compliance is suspected, port 
states can take a brief sample from the ship’s anti-fouling system.   
 
 The legal grounds in ILO No. 147 Convention 
The ILO, a specialized agency of the United Nations founded in 1919 to seek promotion 
of social justice in respect of human and labour rights, adopted its first maritime 
Conventions in 19205. Since the first official discussion in ILO in 1933, the ILO No. 147 
Convention was the result of a long discussion in ILO (Kasoulides, 1993).  
The ILO No. 147 Convention, which was incorporated in the MLC, was adopted in 1976 
and came into force in 1981. The Convention consists of 12 Articles and one Appendix, 
without detailed technical requirements, which is a list of other ILO Conventions that have 
the same effect to be ratified simultaneously when that Convention is ratified by member 
states. Therefore, the ILO No. 147 Convention, so called “umbrella convention”, covers in 
respect of seafarers’ working conditions including hours of work, manning, officers’ 
competency and safety standards to prevent accident, social security measures and 
shipboard conditions of employment and living arrangements.  
 Though Article 4 of the Convention provides the grounds on the right of a port state’s 
intervention, the approach of its inspection is interpreted more narrowly compared to the 
regulations of other IMO Conventions. This Article states that the port state may conduct an 
inspection when receiving a complaint or obtaining evidence that the ship does not conform 
to the requirements of this Convention. This means that the inspection under the 
Convention is deemed “passive” while IMO Conventions such as SOLAS and MARPOL are 
more active to conduct PSC inspections with respect to port states. 
 
2.2 No more favorable treatment clause 
 
A treaty or international convention is adopted by a signature or expressed agreement of 
consent of each government to have that effect after negotiations. According to paragraph 
3 of Article 24 under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, by establishing 
the consent of a State to be bound on specific date after the treaty has come into force, the 
treaty enters into force for that State on that date unless the treaty otherwise provides. 
Additionally, every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it according to Article 26 of 
the Convention. These clauses explain the general principles of international laws that the 
                                               
5 Minimum Age (Sea) Convention (No. 7), Unemployment Indemnity Shipwreck Convention (No. 8) 
and Placing of Seaman Convention (No. 9). 
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states under their free will consent to the treaty to observe the obligations required by it 
become the parties to that treaty and that, unless provided otherwise, non-parties are not 
bound to it generally. For instance, PSC under the SOLAS 19146 applied not to all ships 
called in the ports of contracting party, but ships flagged in the contracting governments 
(Ozcayir, 2004). Other examples can be found in certain ILO maritime conventions, i.e. 
Article 6.1 of the ILO No. 147 Convention and Article 18.1 of the ILO No. 180 Convention 
clearly describe that “this Convention shall be binding only upon those Members of the 
Organization whose ratifications have been registered”. 
On the contrary to the above principle, the ICLL Convention introduced “no more 
favorable treatment” (NMFT) clause in 1930. The clause might apply to similar levels of 
convention rules to ships, regardless of being non-party to the Convention of a ship’s flag 
state, and provide the same playing level of competition by preventing them from enjoying 
any premium of ships registered in the non-parties to a Convention. Article 17 of the 
Convention describes that “the privileges of this Convention may not be claimed in favour of 
any ship unless it holds a valid International Load Line Certificate”. Furthermore, the Article 
22 of ICLL 1966 and Regulation 20 of Chapter I of SOLAS 1974 have nearly the same 
wording as that Article.  
It is also indicative that paragraph 4 of Article 5 of MARPOL Convention, 1973, clearly 
states that “with respect to the ships of non-Parties to the Convention, Parties shall apply 
the requirements of the present Convention as may be necessary to ensure that NMFT is 
given to such ships”. Additionally, the NMFT clause gradually incorporates to paragraph 5 
of Article X of STCW 1978, Article II(3) of Protocol 1978 and Article I(3) of Protocol 1988 of 
SOLAS 1974 and paragraph 1.5 of IMO Resolution A.787(19), which describes procedures 
for PSC adopted in 1995 (IMO, 2001). Hence, port States have clear legal grounds for 
inspecting all ships including vessels flagged in non-party to the Conventions. 
These clauses of NMFT offer a justification for PSC by providing a remedy to solve a 
drawback for applying the regulations of Conventions to the ships of non-Contracting 
parties, which are generally not applied to these Conventions. Furthermore, the clauses 
have accelerated flag states to ratify a Convention by removing the advantages of non-
Parties to that Convention. For instance, it accounts over 99 percent of world gross tonnage 
for the ships of members have ratified the main Conventions of PSC under the auspices of 
IMO such as ICLL 1966, Annex I and II of MARPOL 1973/1978, SOLAS 1974 and STCW 
1978 (IMO, 2017). 
                                               
6 Article 61 of the Convention described that every ship of contracting State is subject in the ports of 
other contracting States to control by authorized officers. This intent of the Article was succeeded by 
next versions of SOLAS and even SOLAS 1974, which stipulates that every ship when in a port of 
another Contracting Government is subject to the control of officers duly authorized. 
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2.3 Development of regional PSC cooperation arrangements  
 
 Paris MoU 
The Paris MoU succeeding the Hague MOU mentioned previously in section 1.1, was 
initially signed by 14 States in January 1982 and was effective from July 1982 (Ozcayir, 
2004; Paris MoU, 2016a). Its members have extended to 27 States as of 2016, including 
European Union countries, Norway, Iceland, Russia and Canada. 
The MOU itself is a kind of “gentleman’s agreement”, not creating any legal obligations to 
its members. However, the European Commission adopted the EC Directive 95/21/EC, 
which imposes obligations on its member states of the European Union to inspect at least 
annually 25 percent of individual ships calling at their ports from July 1996 (Ozcayir, 2004). 
Furthermore, innovative measures were introduced when the 24 year-old oil tanker Erica 
and the 25 year-old oil tanker Prestige accidents in December 1999 and November 2002 
respectively, caused serious environmental pollution along the Atlantic coast of west 
Europe.  
In January 2002, the European Commission adopted Directive 2001/105/EC and 
Directive 2001/106/EC, which are amendments to Directive 95/21/EC. The Directives, in 
respect of short term legislative measures, the so called Erica Package I, proposed several 
measures and became effective on 22 July 2003 (European Union, 2007a). The measures 
included banning the access of multi-detained vessels7 to its ports and dictating the 
conduct of more stringent inspection for old-age ships and supervising classification 
societies with more stringent quality criteria. 
A long-term package of legislative measures, the Erica Package II, was also adopted by 
the Commission (European Union, 2007b). A vessel monitoring and information system8 
was established by the Directive 2002/59/EC to reduce the risk of accidents in geographic 
chokepoints such as the English Channel and the Strait of Gibraltar. Vessels bound for EU 
ports are required to report to port authorities 24 hours before arrival. Additionally a 
compensation fund, named COPE, and the European Maritime Safety Agency9 is 
established (European Union, 2015a). 
                                               
7 It is denied to enter the ports of the Union for ships older than fifteen years that have been detained 
by PSC more than twice within the two preceding years 
8 It is named to “SafeSeaNet” operated by the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) 
9 EMSA was established by EC Regulation No 1406/2002, which took into force 27 June 2002, to 
“ensure a high, uniform and effective level of maritime safety, maritime security and prevention and 
response to pollution caused by ships or by oil and gas installations” 
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To improve the existing legislative measures on maritime safety, the European 
Commission adopted in March 2009, the so-called Erica Package III, which became 
effective on 17 June 2009 (European Commission, 2017; GARD, 2010). The Directive 
2009/21/EC requires EU member states to ensure the quality of safety standards of their 
ships and not register them in the black or grey lists of the Paris MoU. The Directive 
2009/16/EC aims to increase the effectiveness of the existing PSC scheme; it describes 
that all vessels calling on EU ports should be inspected based on a risk profile and that a 
blacklist of companies operating substandard ships as well as flag states is published.  
These “Erica Packages” of the European Commission were incorporated into the Paris 
MoU accordingly, which gives the effect of strengthening the port states’ power to control 
foreign vessels (Ozcayir, 2004). Thus, the MoU is supplemented and transformed into a 
“half legal entity” by its EU member States that have vigorous enforcement powers to deny 
the entry of foreign vessels with multiple detentions according to Section 4 of the MoU10.  
The instruments of the Paris MoU according to its paragraph 2.1 are 12 Conventions 
with their Protocols including SOLAS 1974, MARPOL 1973/1978, STCW 1978, ILO No. 147, 
MLC and the International Convention for Control and Management of Ship’s Ballast Water 
and Sediments (BWM), 2004, which entered into force on the 8 September 2017. The 
interesting instruments of the MoU are the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil 
Pollution Damage (CLC 1969) including the 1992 Protocol and International Convention on 
Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage (Bunker Convention) (Paris MoU, 2016b). 
These two Conventions that were incorporated by the Directive 2001/106/EC and Directive 
2013/38/EC respectively are not listed in the applicable conventions according to the 
“Procedures for PSC”, IMO A.27/Res.1052, adopted in 2011. It is deemed that no clear 
clause provides the right of sanctions of port states against foreign vessels in the 
Conventions while contracting port states are given obligations, through paragraph 11 of 
Article 7 of the CLC and paragraph 12 of Article 7 of the Bunker Convention, to check the 
validity of insurances or other relevant security items of these ships as required by those 
Conventions (European Union, 2015b). 
The Paris MoU publishes the PSC performance of flag states, whose vessels have been 
more than 30 inspections over a 3-year rolling period, based on the detention rate 
calculated by its specific formula (Paris MoU, 2016c). A State having a low risk to be 
detained is categorized in the “White list” while a State with high risk is registered in “Black 
                                               
10 For instance, if a ship of a flag state in the Grey List of the MoU’s annual report was detained twice 
in the course of the preceding 24 months, the ship should be prohibited to enter the EU ports for 3 
months. If a ship flying a flag in the Black List is detained twice within 36 months, the ship is under the 
same sanction. The sanction for multiple detentions gradually increases for 12 months, 24 months 
and permanence against the second, third and fourth refusal orders respectively 
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list”. If the State is between two groups it comes into the “Grey list”. The ships flagged into 
the Black list are at a disadvantage of being more frequently inspected than other ships in 
the Grey and White list. Additionally the MoU releases the performance of each RO having 
a minimum of 60 inspections over a 3-year rolling period with the same formula to calculate 
that of the flag states (Paris MoU, 2016d).  
 
 Tokyo MOU 
The Tokyo MOU was signed in December 1993 and has been effective since April 1994 
for the purpose of “an improved and harmonized system of PSC and of strengthening 
cooperation and the exchange of information” (Tokyo MOU, 2016a). The MOU was 
established under impetus from the IMO Res. A.682(17) adopted in 1991, which the 
organization invites States to consider concluding and participating in the regional PSC 
MOU.  
The Tokyo MOU, as a non-binding entity, has not any enforcement power and provides a 
guideline for the general commitment inspection of its 20 full member authorities11. Hence, 
each authority voluntarily determines its national inspection target for individual foreign 
vessels while the Committee of the MOU monitors the overall inspection activity of the 
member authorities to achieve the regional inspection rate of 80% of the total number of 
ships operating in the region according to paragraph 1.4 of the MOU.  
The instruments of the MOU include SOLAS, MARPOL, STCW, ICLL, ILO No. 147 
Convention, MLC, BWM and CLC 1969; it is very similar to the Paris MoU, except the 
Bunker Convention. This MOU stipulates that an authority do not impose excessive 
standards on foreign vessels rather than those applicable to its national flagged ships when 
applying the regulations of the relevant instruments for PSC.  
The Tokyo MOU annually publishes its Black, Grey and White lists based on the flag 
state’s performance. Its evaluation formula is similar to that of the Paris MoU. Additionally, 
Under-performing ship list is published to increase pressures on substandard shipowners. 
The member authorities are requested to inspect the ships in the list, which have been 
detained for three or more times in the region during the last 12 months. As of May 2017, 
there are 11 vessels in the list (Tokyo MOU, 2017a).  
The MOU carries out its Concentrated Inspection Campaign (CIC), normally for three 
months, on specific areas to prevent accidents related to emerging issues or to check 
shipping industry’s preparedness on new regulations. The MOU has been conducted its 
                                               
11 Australia, Canada, Chile, China, Fiji, Hong Kong(China), Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, 
Malaysia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Peru, the 
Philippines, the Russian Federation,  Singapore, Thailand, Vanuatu and Viet Nam 
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CIC on fire safety system, propulsion and auxiliary machinery, STCW hours of rest, crew 
familiarization for enclosed space entry and cargo securing arrangement from 2012 to 2016 
(Tokyo MOU, 2016b). The most of its CICs have been conducted with Paris MoU for a 
decade. Especially the CIC in 2015 was carried out by five other PSC regional cooperation 
schemes including the Latin American Agreement, the Indian Ocean Memorandum of 
Understanding (IOMoU), the Mediterranean Memorandum of Understanding (MedMoU), 
and the Black Sea Memorandum of Understanding (BSMoU). The next CIC will jointly be 
carried out with the Paris MoU on the Safety of Navigation including ECDIS and the 
MARPOL Annex VI in 2017 and 2018 respectively.     
 
 Other PSC MOUs 
Spurred by the Paris MoU and IMO Res. A.682(17), the Latin American Agreement was 
signed on 5 November 1992. Its membership is termed as Members, Co-operating 
Members and Observers, as similar to the Tokyo MOU (Latin American Agreement, 2017). 
As of May 2017, its full membership is 15 authorities12.  
The instruments of the Agreement include numerous IMO Conventions as stated in IMO 
Resolution A.1052(27). However, the ILO No. 147 and MLC Conventions are not included, 
whereas, the CLC 1969 is. The minimum inspection target of each member authority of the 
Agreement is 20 percent of the calling foreign vessels during the last 6 months according to 
paragraph 1.3 of the Agreement.  
Following the establishment of the Tokyo MOU in 1994, Caribbean MOU, MedMoU, 
IOMoU, Abuja MOU and BSMoU were signed in 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999 and 2000 
respectively. The latest regional cooperation scheme on PSC among the nine MOUs is the 
Riyadh MOU signed in 2004.  Although their instruments are nearly similar with the ones of 
the Tokyo MOU, the Riyadh MOU excludes the ILO No. 147, MLC and CLC 1969 
Conventions.  
The annual inspection target is set to 15 percent of the ships calling at each member 
authority of the Caribbean, Mediterranean, Abuja and Riyadh MOU while the Indian Ocean 
MOU agrees each authority inspects 10 percent of all visiting foreign ships. The BSMoU 
has a similar target to the Tokyo MOU to inspect 75 percent of those visiting in the region 
annually. The regional MOUs, except the Abuja MOU, have been conducted their CIC 
inspection for specific areas (IMO Secretariat, 2016). 
The inspection data, including detailed detentions, are released through each MOU’s 
public website for transparency. The detention rate varied from 0.48 percent of the Abuja 
                                               
12 Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, 
Peru, Dominican Republic, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
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MOU to 6.26 percent of the IOMOU in 2014. The detention rate of the Paris MoU was 3.32 
percent in 2014; the Tokyo MOU one was 3.96 percent. For imposing more pressure on 
substandard vessels, the IOMoU, Abuja MOU and BSMoU have published underperforming 
ship list similar to the Tokyo MOU. 
 
 PSC activity of the USCG 
The introduction of ship inspection in the United States ports took place in 1838; the 
inspection program has been reinforced via several stages since then with the ratification of 
the ILO No. 147 Convention in June 1988 (Boisson, 1999). On May 1 1994, by the request 
of the U.S. Congress, the USCG has changed its PSC policy to concentrate its control on 
substandard ships based on the performance of their owners, charterers, ROs and flag 
states (Ozcayir, 2004). The instruments of its inspections are mainly IMO Conventions and 
the ILO No. 147 Convention.  
Its inspection priority is basically provided by the boarding matrix that is calculated based 
on the weighing points of an individual vessel for five parameters of ship management 
(owner, operator or charterer), flag state , RO, vessel history (inspection, marine casualty 
and marine violation) and ship particulars (type and age). The Priority I ships are those 
having a higher total targeting score, which is the sum of weighing points for each 
parameter, or involved marine casualty or whose RO has more than two percent or greater 
than the average detention ratio. These ships are targeted for inspection before entering 
U.S. ports and may be restricted from port entry (USCG 2017). Vessels having a medium 
targeting score, or with outstanding requirements from a previous inspection, or has not 
been inspected within the last 12 months, are categorized as Priority II, which is targeted to 
examine before cargo operations or passenger embarkation/disembarkation while Non-
Priority vessels with low safety and environment risks may randomly be selected for 
inspection.  
The USCG publishes the annual “Targeted Flag list”, which has a higher detention ratio 
than the three-year overall average of the USCG. There are 15 states in the list based on 
the performance of 2013-2015 (USCG, 2016a). The authority also releases the lists of 
targeted ship managements and charterers that have been associated with two or more 
safety detentions within the past twelve months. Additionally, a ship that has been detained 
three times within a twelve month period must be conducted as an expanded inspection of 
ISM for determining the banning of entry into U.S. ports (USCG, 2010). There are three 
vessels in the banning list since the application of the measure took place in 2010 (USCG, 
2016b). 
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 MARITIME LABOUR CONVENTION (MLC) 
  
3.1 The background and characteristics of the MLC  
 
Since adopting the first convention on seafarers’ labour rights in 1920, the ILO has 
adopted around 41 Conventions for the shipping industry. However, dozens of the 
Conventions have not been effective due to a limited number of ratifications by member 
states of the Organization, while some of the Conventions have been ratified by a large 
number enough to enter into force. Another inconvenience of the Conventions compared to 
the IMO Conventions is that the scope of each Convention deals with a too specific narrow 
area and that hence many conventions exist to cover the seafarers’ labour rights. For 
instance, the ILO No. 16 Convention deals with the medical examination of young persons 
and the ILO No. 58 Convention covers the minimum age of seafarers with only 12 Articles.  
Another problem in respect to secure seafarers’ right is the lack of enforcement power to 
implement the requirements of the ILO’s Conventions. As shipping is the most 
internationalized industry, flag states having the jurisdiction of control on their ships are not 
effective to ensure their ships to maintain seafarers’ onboard working condition because of 
ship’s mobility and less calling their home port.  
Since initiating discussion to improve seafarers’ labour lights in the late of 1990s, the 
Joint Maritime Commission launched a project in 2000 that is called “Geneva Accord” to 
collect all relevant ILO instruments and merge them into one single convention. The next 
year, considering unique tripartite system of the Organization consisting of representatives of 
workers, employers and governments, a High Level Tripartite Working Group was created to 
deal the issues of the Geneva Accord. The working group prepared the draft of the MLC for 
the Diplomatic Conference in 2006 following several important meetings to reach the goal 
(Durler, 2010).  
The MLC was adopted by the majority of the members of the attendants to the 
Conference in 2006. The Convention not having a Convention number, unlikely to other ILO 
Conventions, consolidated 68 international conventions and recommendations on maritime 
labour issues under the auspices of ILO instruments (Abel, 2014; Durler, 2010; ILO, 2017a). 
The Convention covers seafarers’ living and working conditions, including employment, 
welfare, food and prevention of occupational accidents on board (Mejia, 2016) 
The Convention consists of Articles, Regulations and a two-part Code, where Part A 
provides binding standards while Part B is dealing with non-compulsory Guidelines. The 16 
Articles of the Convention prescribe general obligations, including the implementation and 
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enforcement of member states, scope of application, fundamental rights of seafarers, entry 
into force and procedures of amendments. Its Regulations and Code are organized into five 
Titles13. Each Title contains the groups of provisions with connected numbering, which 
consist of hierarchical composition of relevant Regulation, Part A and Part B of the Code. 
Following the Articles of the Convention, there is an Explanatory Note to the Regulation and 
Code which is intended as a general guide to understand the legal relationship among the 
Regulation, Part A and Part B of the Code but do not form of the Convention (ILO, 2009). 
The Note is a “new figure” in respect to the physical format of convention structure, which is 
extremely rare in the existing IMO and ILO maritime Conventions (McConnell, Devlin, & 
Doumbia-Henry, 2011).   
The MLC became effective on August 20, 2013 after 12 months from the date of 
ratifications by at least 30 states, whose total share accounts for more than 33 percent of 
world total gross tonnage of merchant fleet (Article VIII). Among existing 41 ILO maritime 
Conventions, 37 legal instruments including one Protocol are revised by the Article X of the 
Convention14 (International Labour Office, 2015). This Article has another effect: the 
countries that do not ratify the MLC will remain bound by the existing Conventions that they 
have ratified, although those instruments will be closed to further ratification. For instance, 
the state ratified both ILO No. 147 Convention and MLC leads the effect to automatically 
denounce from former convention. Out of 56 states that ratified the ILO No. 147 Convention, 
15 states of non-party to the MLC including the United States and Brazil, as of May 2017, 
still maintain the status of contracting government to the Convention (ILO, 2017b) 
Another characteristic of MLC in terms of contents is allowing the flexibility of the national 
level in its implementation. There are two main areas of flexibility as stated in the 
Explanatory note of the Convention: one is the possibility for a member to recognize 
substantial equivalence having the same effect to the Standards of the Convention as 
defined in paragraph 3 and 4 of Article VI and the other is empowering a wider scope of 
national discretion through the compulsory Standards of the Convention. The former, like 
the Regulation 5 of Chapter I of SOLAS 1974 and Regulation 5 of MARPOL Annex I for 
accepting an alternative fitting, materials and design to adapt new technology or specific 
surroundings, should have at least the effect as those required by the relevant Regulation 
                                               
13  Title 1: ”Minimum requirements for seafarers to work on a ship”, Title 2: “Conditions of 
employment”,  Title 3: “Accommodation, recreational facilities, food and catering”, Title 4: “Health 
protection, medical care, welfare and social security protection” and Title 5: “Compliance and 
enforcement”. 
14  Four conventions were excluded; the ILO No. 15 Convention on minimum age (trimmers and 
stokers), ILO No. 71 Convention on seafarers’ pensions, and ILO No. 108 and 185 Conventions on 
seafarers’ identity documents. 
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and clearly be recorded in Part I of the Declaration of the maritime labour compliance 
(DMLC) according to paragraph 10 of Standard A5.1.3. While the latter grants flexibility for 
each flag state, it seems to cause an adverse effect of hampering the universality of unified 
regulations.  
The other powerful development is enhancing implementation by certification and PSC 
including NMFT on the ships of non-party to the Convention. Certification to ships imposes 
responsibility on the flag state to implement the requirements of the Convention while PSC 
acts as supplementing flag states as well as monitoring their performance. 
On the other hand, each contracting government is asked to submit its annual reports on 
how to implement ratified Conventions to International Labour Office according to Article 22 
of the Constitution of the ILO. Thus, member authorities of the MLC make the report that is 
given their new legislative measures affecting the application of the Convention, replies to 
the questions in the form on the practical application and replies to comments regarding the 
application of the Convention by the supervisory bodies (ILO, 2010). The information 
provided by each contracting government would be reviewed by supervisory bodies and, 
where necessary, is made comments that give the effect for ILO to evaluate the 
performance quality of flag state as like acting function of “white list” by the STCW 
mentioned in 2.1.5.    
 
3.2 Application of the MLC 
 
The MLC basically applies to all seafarers who are employed or engaged in any capacity 
on board a ship to which this Convention applies (Article II.2). If there is a question as to 
whether certain categories of persons are to be regarded as seafarers, the flag state would 
determine it after consultation with the shipowners’ and seafarers’ organizations (Article 
II.3). 
Considering the traditional concept that a master is an allegiant agent for the owners in 
commercial matters, as well as a representative of the ship and an administrator for ship’s 
crew in public aspect, masters had not been regarded as a seafarer by other Conventions 
and especially shipowners’ party (Cartner, 2014). According to the definition of the 
Convention, a ship’s master is also defined as a seafarer (Cartner, 2014; Durler, 2010). 
Hence, a master has the rights of enjoying decent working and living conditions as a 
seafarer in personal entity while he or she, in respect of public view, has the duties to 
familiar with following regulations of the Convention and to secure their implementation 
(Standard A5.1.3.7(c))15. 
                                               
15 record-keeping of seafarers’ employment document on board, recording hours of rest, ensuring 
repatriation, maintaining safe manning level, preserving decent accommodation and recreation 
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The Convention applies to all ships, ordinarily engaged in commercial activities, other 
than fishing boats, warships, naval auxiliaries and traditional ships such as dhows and 
junks (Article II.4). However, the Convention does not apply to ships that navigate 
exclusively in inland waters or waters within, or closely adjacent to, sheltered waters or 
areas where port regulations apply by the definition of ship (Article II.1(i)). Flag states 
determine whether a specific category of ships applies to this Convention or not (Article II.5).      
Any determination by flag stats as to whether a specific person on board or ships apply 
to this Convention and application of grace period for certain rules to domestic ships of less 
than 200 gross tonnage shall be communicated to the Director-General of International 
Labour Office, who notify them to the member states (Article II.7). For instance, by the 
determination of the Republic of Korea according to the Article, the followings are not 
regarded as a seafarer: technicians and workers temporarily joining a ship for the purpose 
of repairing the ship; harbour pilots, workers working for ships only operating in harbor area; 
trainees and cadets (ILO, 2016).  
While most IMO Conventions apply new rules to a ship if the ship is under the category 
of a major conversion or alteration for a specific regulation, the MLC does not apply such a 
definition. This means Regulation 3.1.2 of the MLC that relates to ship construction and 
equipment applies to ships constructed on or after the twentieth August 2013, regardless of 
a ship’s conversion date. This is also clearly stated in paragraph 2.2 of the Tokyo MOU.  
 
3.3 PSC under the MLC 
 
Unlike other ILO maritime Conventions, the MLC gives clear legal grounds of the port 
states’ right to exercise active PSC inspections on foreign vessels calling at their ports 
(Article V.4 and Regulation 5.2). The regulations are deemed not to impose obligation to port 
states while the flag states have an obvious obligation to control their ships under paragraph 
7 of Article V. This means PSC, as a general obligation of the contracting government, is a 
discretionary power to protect its national interests and to secure the goals of the relevant 
Conventions (Kasoulidies, 1993).  
The MLC clearly describes the NMFT clause in paragraph 7 of Article V that the 
Convention applies to the ships flagged in non-ratifying states. Thus, the port state that has 
ratified the MLC, as the same as most of IMO Conventions, may inspect foreign ships in its 
ports regardless of their nationality in order to set a level playing ground.      
                                                                                                                                                  
facilities and catering, taking measures accident prevention, posting inspection reports by flag stats 
and establishing on-board complaint procedures. 
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On the other hand, MLC has a unique procedure for seafarers to report a breach of the 
Convention to the competent authority when they visit a harbor for the prompt and practical 
measure of remediation according to Regulation 5.2.2. The port authority receiving seafarer 
complaints should undertake relevant investigations, which is the obligation of the port state. 
The scope of the investigation by receiving a complaint is not limited to one of the 14 areas 
listed in Appendix A5-III of the Convention according to paragraph 79 of the Guidelines for 
port state control officers under the MLC, 2006 (PSC Guideline) adopted by the tripartite 
expert’s meeting in 2008. If the complaint is not resolved at the ship-board level, it should be 
notified to the flag state or where necessary to the Director-General of the International 
Labour Office. Before reporting to the port administration, seafarers may directly raise the 
issue to the ship’s committee or master of the ship or lodge to the external authorities 
(Standard A5.1.5). The on-board complaint procedures should be provided to include the 
right of seafarers to be accompanied or represented during the procedure and safeguard 
against the possibility of seafarer’s victimization for filing complaints. The paragraph 7 of the 
Standard describes that safeguard measures on the confidentiality of the complaints should 
be taken. 
 
3.4 Challenges of conducting PSC in relation to MLC 
 
The instruments of PSC are normally based on “applicable international standards”, 
which mean international conventions, rather than national requirements. When conducting 
a PSC, the port authority is requested to exercise its power without discrimination against 
foreign vessels voluntarily calling at its ports according to Article 227 of UNCLOS. As a more 
specific example, paragraph 2.6 of the Tokyo MOU describes that the port authority will not 
impose standards on foreign vessels that are in excess of the standard applicable to ships 
flying the flag of that port state. In addition, the port authority exercises its power within 
reasonable expectation because excessive measures by the authority may cause retaliatory 
measures by its counterparts (Kasoulides, 1993). 
Although the Convention does not describe specific requirements, there are simple ideas 
on the policy of inspection and enforcement activities and on the professional profile and 
requirements of the authorized officers by port states in paragraph 7 of Standard A.5.2.1 and 
paragraph 33~38 of the PSC Guideline. The officers should carry out the PSC inspection in 
a consistent manner based mostly on international standards and be reluctant to apply their 
national requirements that go beyond the standards.  
On the other hand, many Standards to grant national discretion in the MLC are explained 
in 3.1 as shown in Table 1. One of the reasons allowing wide national discretions can be 
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explained by the facts that there are 8 Conventions16 out of 37 Conventions consolidated by 
the MLC, as shown in Table 2, have not been effective. Even the other effective Conventions 
had been ratified only by less than half of the shipping states or dominant flag states at the 
time of MLC adoption. The largest number of ratifications among them is 82 States for the 
ILO No. 16 Convention while most of the other ILO Conventions have recorded less than 50 
contracting governments. It is arguable whether the Conventions ratified only by these small 
numbers of states could be recognized as “generally accepted international regulations” or 
“applicable international rules and standards” by Article 94 and Article 219 of UNCLOS.  
Another reason is that it is necessary to get a result in the agreement of the majority of 
states for the adoption and early entry into force of the MLC, considering that the 30 states 
and 33 percent requirements of the MLC to entry into force are more strict than other ILO 
conventions, i.e. that of ILO No. 147 Convention is 10 members and 25 percent (McConnell, 
Devlin, & Doumbia-Henry, 2011). Furthermore, Title 5 on implementation of flag and port 
states with NMFT clause, as a new context in ILO Conventions, makes States cautious 
when considering their ratification.    
Among two flexibilities in MLC, substantial equivalence should clearly be recorded in 
Part I of the DMLC defined in paragraph 10 of Standard A5.1.3, thus PSC officers could 
easily  identify it and assume its scope of variation from the Standards. While national 
discretion seems to be more complicated for the officers since, although concise national 
regulations are provided in the DMLC, there is no clear reference for deciding whether it is 
relevant or not. To define its relevance, the officers should be accustomed to each flag 
states’ regulations or communicate with the relevant maritime administrations when 
suspecting. Hence, it is deemed difficult to fill these conditions considering that no officers 
are clued up to each member’s national rules. Additionally, getting feedback from the flag 
state in a timely manner is very restricted by the time officers to review the national and 
conventional rules and judge what actions are appropriate to reach the goal of the 
Convention without causing the unduly delay of a ship’s operation. Especially, certain types 
of vessels including containerships, car carriers and cruiser ships stay only for a few hours in 
a harbor, which is not providing adequate time for the officers to communicate other 
administrations to confirm their rules. These constraints may result in a reluctance to inspect 
foreign ships actively for the regulations granting national flexibility.    
  
                                               
16 Holidays with Pay (No.54), Social Security (No. 70), Paid Vacations (No. 72), Wages, Hours of 
Work and Manning (No. 57, 93 and 109), Accommodation of Crews Convention, 1946 (No. 75) and 
Wages, Hours of Work and Manning (Sea) Convention, 1946 (No. 76)  
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 Hypothesis and methodology 
 
4.1 Hypothesis 
 
In the aspect of PSC that should be conducted on the basis of international standards, 
the flexibility of a Flag state should not be desirable and may act as a negative influence 
due to the lack of the knowledge and source of PSC officers for a Flag state’s specific rules. 
It can be expected that such flexibility results in excluding or inactively exercising PSC 
inspection for specific areas.  
On the other hand, the various areas of the MLC are not fully covered by the ILO No. 
147 Convention, which was the only instrument to conduct PSC inspection among the ILO 
Conventions before the adoption of the MLC (Ozcayir, 2004; Paris MoU, 2016b; Tokyo 
MOU, 2016a). Therefore, the PSC inspection results between before and after three years 
of the effectuation of the Convention would be different because the Parties to the MLC and 
the ILO No. 147 Convention and their coverages are not the same as each other. However, 
if we compare the same nature of the deficiency, we can access the change between two 
periods. From the analysis, the paper can evaluate how the MLC acts for the decent 
working and living conditions of seafarers and identify non-compliance areas, which show 
the categories of ships that are vulnerable to the Convention.   
Therefore, this paper, based on these assumptions, will explore the hypothesis that;     
① the flexibility of Flag states’ discretion under the MLC takes an adverse effect to Port 
state enforcements;  
② PSC inspection data can be used as an indicator to show the weak areas of 
implementing the MLC, which can compare the PSC outcomes of the IMO 
conventions to the MLC;  
③ there is a significant change in the statistics between the ILO No. 147 Convention, 
which had been conducted before the entry into force of the MLC, and the MLC;  
and 
④ the PSC results on the MLC between Paris MoU and Tokyo MOU are not the same, 
which reflects their regional circumstance. 
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4.2 Dataset 
 
To demonstrate the hypothesis mentioned in 4.1, the data of the Paris MoU and Tokyo 
MOU are used as shown in Table 3. The reason is that both MOUs are recognized as the 
most active and well-organized ones among nine regional PSC cooperation schemes, as 
explained in 2.3. However, 88,812 deficiency records in this Table are not the same as the 
number in their Annual Reports (Paris MoU, 2013, 2017a; Tokyo MOU, 2017b). This might 
be a result of the re-arrangement of their deficiency coding system for the implementation of 
the MLC.  
Both MOUs developed similar coding systems in order to process data concisely and 
precisely for ship type, flag state, RO, port authority, port of inspection, certificates, 
deficiency group and nature of deficiency. The Deficiency codes of both MOUs have the 
same structure and nearly same codes for deficiencies as shown in Table 4. However, a few 
deficiencies are not exactly the same to each other (Paris MoU, 2017b; Tokyo MOU, 2017c). 
For example, the Tokyo MOU has 13 sub-codes under the ISM deficiency group while the 
Paris MoU has only one sub-code.  
The codes of deficiency group for the ILO No. 147 Convention by both MOUs are 091 
and 092 and that of MLC are 181, 182, 183 and 184, which is the same arrangement to each 
Title of the Conventions. The codes of deficiency groups for both Conventions have several 
sub-codes as shown in Tables 5 and 6.  
The system also includes the certificates related to the MLC, such as Medical certificate 
(deficiency Code 1218), Training and qualification by MLC for personal safety training (1219) 
and Seafarers’ employment agreement (1220) that are categorized into the deficiency group 
of “Certificate and Documentation – Crew Certificate”.  
 
4.3 Methodology 
 
This research has examined the regulations of the MLC by authorizing national 
discretion through the interpretative approach and will carry out an analysis for the PSC data 
of both MOUs. The data will be analyzed by the correlation among ship’s age, type, size, 
nature of deficiencies and detentions for two periods of three years before and after 2013 in 
two regional MOUs. 
The paper will identify the difficulties in carrying out PSC inspection with the flexibility of 
national discretion, the trend of deficiencies and detentions pointed out by both MoUs for two 
ILO Conventions and the weak parts of the MLC in terms of PSC inspection. The discussion 
will then be followed by the outcome of the analysis.  
Therefore, this paper will  
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 review and study some pre-literature and methodologies related to the background 
of the PSC and the MLC; 
 examine the reluctance and difficulties to exercise PSC inspection in the MLC 
regulations including Flag states’ discretion clauses; 
 analyze the PSC inspection data of the Paris MoU and Tokyo MOU of before and 
after three years of MLC implementation ; 
 attempt to interpret the dataset and discuss the implication of analysis and identify 
the statistical trend therefrom; and  
 suggest to lessen the burden of PSC officers dealing the Flag states’ discretion 
clauses in the MLC and to correspond the weak areas be dealt for further 
improvements.  
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 DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
 
5.1 Overview of the PSC results 
 
The total PSC inspections conducted by the Paris MoU have decreased from 24,058 
inspections in 2010 to 17,828 inspections in 2016. Those of the Tokyo MOU have increased 
from 25,762 inspections to 31,678 inspections during the period as shown in Table 7. While 
total number of deficiencies and detentions had been reduced in both MOUs, the detention 
rate of the Paris MoU has maintained an uprising trend from 3.28 percent in 2010 to 3.79 
percent.    
While the deficiencies of the Paris MoU for the MLC including the ILO No. 147 
Convention have decreased from 9,989 in 2010 to 6,730 in 2016, those of the Tokyo MOU 
have increased from 2,990 in 2010 to 6,622 in 2016. The number of detentions related to the 
MLC in the Paris MoU during the six years was 8,607 and its average detention rate to the 
deficiencies was 19.30 percent. On the other hand, the number of detentions in the Tokyo 
MOU during the period was 6,046 with a 19.04 percent of its average detention rate. The 
detention rate in the Paris MoU for both Conventions has been going up from 16.87 percent 
in 2010 to 22.21 percent in 2016 while that of the Tokyo MOU has gone down from 27.79 
percent to 14.56 percent during the period. 
For the deficiencies related to the MLC, both MOUs had the same trends of increasing 
more than 20.7 percent annually during the three years. The deficiency areas for Title 1 
accounted for only 1.6 percent to the whole MLC deficiencies in two MOUs while the 
deficiencies for Title 4 overwhelmed other areas with more than 51.5 percent.  
 
5.2 Statistics of the PSC inspection of the Paris MoU 
 
 Analysis of the deficiencies of the Paris MoU 
 
The most frequently identified deficiency related to both Conventions in the Paris MoU 
during the six years was the cleanliness of engine room (deficiency code 9232) as shown in 
Figure 1. The second was sanitary facilities (9106 and 18302) followed by electrical (9209) 
and ropes/wires (9227), which are the deficiency group of working conditions. The next 
deficiency was personal equipment (18412) and wages (18203). The highest detention rate 
among major deficiencies in the MoU was code 18203 with 52.0 percent followed by 
provisions quantity (18314 and 9128), code 18302 and ventilation for accommodation (9103).  
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Figure 1  Major detentions in the Paris MoU 
 
For the relationship of ship type-age compared between 2010-2012 and 2014-2016, the 
number of deficiencies for General cargo ships was decreasing in all ages except for 5-10 
and 15-20 years intervals as shown in Figure 2. The number of deficiencies for the type, 
which was the largest one with 20,423 deficiencies (44.8 percent) among a total of 45,579 
deficiencies during the period, peaked at the age interval of 25-35 years. The second largest 
type was Bulk carriers with 9,212 deficiencies (20.2 percent) that were increasing up to 20 
years after implementing the MLC compared to those of before 2013. The Most deficiencies 
were for Containerships with 3,154 deficiencies in the range of 5-20 years. Chemical tankers 
had the trend of increasing deficiencies for the range of 5-15 years after 2013. RO-RO cargo 
ships having a 3.50 percent share fluctuated in ages and peaked their deficiencies at the 
interval of 30-35 years. The Refrigerated cargo carrier of the ranges of 15-30 years had a 
higher portion of deficiencies while 5-15 years-old Oil tankers had many deficiencies for the 
type. Additionally, the distribution of deficiencies by nine age groups fluctuated from 5.7 
percent for 40 years and above to 14.8 percent for 25-30 years.  
The analysis for the other ship types are excluded in this study since those are not 
seemed as major ones. Also the limitation of this study’s wording is considered.  
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Figure 2 The deficiencies of the Paris MoU by ship type-age 
 
The deficiencies of General cargo ships for the six intervals of relationship between ship 
type and gross tonnage were decreasing after 2013 compared to before 2013 as shown in 
Figure 3. The interval of 2,000-5,000 tons of the type peaked with 5,826 deficiencies during 
2010-2012 and 4,834 deficiencies after 2013. Bulk carrier’s deficiencies were concentrated 
in the range of 5,000-50,000 tons and the interval of 20,000-50,000 tons increased and 
peaked with 2,709 deficiencies after 2013. Containerships had the most deficiencies for 
5,000 tons and above and peaked at the interval of 5,000-20,000 tons with 699 deficiencies 
before 2013.  
 
 
Figure 3  The deficiencies of the Paris MoU by ship type-gross tonnage 
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Chemical tanker’s deficiencies positioned in the range of 2,000-50,000 tons and had no 
significant changes before and after 2013. Oil tankers were increasing deficiencies in the 
range of 20,000 and above after 2013. Refrigerated cargo carriers’ deficiencies peaked at 
829 in the interval of 5,000-20,000 tons before 2013 and fell to 332 after 2013. 
The deficiencies of less than 500 gross tons and less than 5 years were 8.6 percent of 
the total deficiencies among nine intervals of ship ages and increased at the interval of 40 
years and above from 77 to 233 after 2013 as shown in Figure 4. The deficiencies of 500-
2,000 tons after 2013 had a smaller number than those of before 2013 and hit a high point of 
873 at the interval of 25-30 years. Similarly, 2,000-5,000 tons’ deficiencies took a higher 
portion in the range of 25-35 years. 5,000-20,000 tons’ deficiencies peaked with 1,466 after 
2013 at the interval of 5-10 years and jumped from 804 before 2013. The deficiencies of 
20000-50,000 tons increased after 2013 compared to those of before 2013 up to 20 years 
and had small portions after 30 years. The deficiencies of 50,000 tons and over marked less 
than 317 with reducing to less than 77 in the range of 20 years and above. 
 
 
Figure 4  The deficiencies of the Paris MoU by gross tonnage-age 
 
The greatest deficiencies for General cargo ships was the deficiency code 9106 in Table 
6 followed by medical equipment (code 9112), cold room temperature (9132), code 9128 
and cleanliness for living conditions (9127) as shown in Figure 5. Bulk carriers had a similar 
trend except for positioning code 1220 in fifth place. The major deficiencies of 
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Containerships, Chemical tankers, Oil tankers and Refrigerated cargo carriers were similar 
to those of Bulk carriers.  
 
 
Figure 5  The deficiencies of the Paris MoU by ship type-deficiency code 
 
Ships of less than five years old had high frequent deficiency codes of 9209, 9112, and  
9298 while the highest deficiency for the group of 5-10 years was code 18408 followed by 
the codes of 9232, 9209, 18324 (cold room, cold room cleanliness, cold room temperature) 
and 9298 as shown in Figure 6. The highest deficiency codes for the group of 10-15 years 
were the codes of 9232, 9209, 9298, 18408 and 18425 (access / structural features), which 
was nearly the same trend with the other groups.  
 
 
Figure 6  The deficiencies of the Paris MoU by ship age- deficiency code 
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 Analysis of the detentions of Paris MoU 
The number of detentions for General cargo ships was generally increasing as a ship’s 
age gets higher and the interval of 5-10 years and 15-20 years increased in the number of 
detentions after 2013, compared to those of before 2013 as shown in Figure 7. The number 
of detentions for this type was the largest with 4,840 detentions (56.2 percent) among a total 
of 8,607 detentions during the period, peaking at 548 at the age interval of 30-35 years 
before 2013. The second largest type was Bulk carriers with 1,572 detentions (18.3 percent), 
which was increasing after 2013, compared to those of before 2013 except for the interval of 
25-30 years. 10-20 year old Containerships were more vulnerable to be detained and the 
intervals of 5-10 years and 20-25 years had more detentions after 2013 than before 2013. 
Interestingly, RO-RO cargo ships were the fourth largest group with 325 detentions peaking 
at the interval of 25-30 years. Chemical tankers had the trend of increasing detentions for 
the range of 5-15 years after 2013, while the age groups of 25-30 years and 30-35 years 
accounted for more than 17.0 percent of the total detentions respectively, the group of less 
than five years taking 4.2 percent. Oil tankers recorded only 155 detentions during 6 years. 
 
 
Figure 7  The detentions of the Paris MoU by ship type-age 
 
About 51.7 percent of the detentions for General cargo ships were marked at the interval 
of 2,000-5,000 gross tonnage. Detentions of the groups of 2,000-5,000 and 5,000-20,000 
tons rose after 2013 compared to before 2013 as shown in Figure 8. About 95.8 percent of 
the detentions for Bulk carriers were concentrated in the range of 5,000-50,000 tons, which 
were increasing after 2013, compared to those of before 2013. The range of 5,000-50,000 
tons of Containers accounted for 86.5 percent of their detentions. The intervals of 5,000-
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20,000 and 50,000 tons and above for the type were increasing after 2013 compared to 
those of before 2013. The range of 5,000-50,000 tons of RO-RO cargo ships accounted for 
74.5 percent of their detentions and the detentions of the range increased after 2013, 
compared to before 2013. The group of 2,000-5,000 tons of Chemical tankers shared 41.4 
percent of detentions for the type and the 5,000-20,000 tons’ interval increased after 2013, 
compared to those of before 2013.  
  
 
Figure 8  The detentions of the Paris MoU by ship type-gross tonnage 
 
The detentions of less than 500 gross tons accounted for only 3.3 percent of the total 
detentions of six groups and the interval of 40 years and above took 46.5 percent of the 
group’s detention as shown in Figure 9. The detentions of the 500-2,000 ton group 
concentrated with 85.7 percent in the range of 25 years and above. The 2,000-5,000 ton 
group had the highest detention with 34.1 percent, accounting for 65.3 percent in the group 
for the age of 25 and above. The 5,000-20,000 ton detentions peaked at the age of 15-20 
and were increasing in seven intervals, except the intervals of less than five years and 25-30 
years after 2013, compared to those of before 2013. The detentions of the 20,000-50,000 
ton group were increasing after 2013 compared to those of before 2013 up to 20 years and 
accounted for 32.7 percent in the group for the age of 25 and above. The detentions of 
50,000 tons and over, which were the lowest among the groups, accounted for only 1.6 
percent. The range of 10-20 years shared 62.6 percent for the group’s detention and  were 
increasing after 2013 compared to those of before 2013. 
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Figure 9  The detentions of the Paris MoU by gross tonnage-age 
 
The greatest detention item for General cargo ships was deficiency code 9232 with 332 
detentions followed by the codes of 9106, 9209, 9227 and 18412 as shown in Figure 10. The 
major deficiency codes of Bulk carrier detentions were 9232, 9106, 18302, 9209 and 9298.  
Those of Containerships were 9232, 9209, 9298, 9203 (Lighting for working spaces) and 
18420 (Cleanliness of engine room) while the codes of 9232, 18424, 9106, 9207 and 9112 
were for Chemical tankers. RO-RO cargo ships were mainly detained by the deficiency 
codes of 9232, 18408, 9298, 9209 and 18420.  
 
 
Figure 10  The detentions of the Paris MoU by ship type-deficiency code 
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5.3 Statistics of the PSC inspection of the Tokyo MOU 
 
 Analysis of the deficiencies of the Tokyo MOU 
The most notable deficiency in the Tokyo MOU was records of rest (deficiency code 
1308) followed by code 9232, gangway/accommodation ladder (9223) and others for 
accident prevention (9298) as shown in Figure 11. The top 15 deficiencies in the MOU were 
under the deficiency group of working conditions, except code 1308, schedules for 
watchkeeping personnel (1306) and seafarers’ employment agreement (1220). The next 
coming deficiencies were electrical (code 18408), manning specified by the minimum safe 
manning (1209) and ropes/ wires (18416). The highest detention rate among major 
deficiencies in the MOU was code 1209 with 37.0 percent followed by code 18203, other for 
working space (9297) and code 18314. 
 
 
Figure 11 Major detentions in Tokyo MOU 
 
The largest ship type having deficiencies related to the MLC and ILO No. 147 
Conventions in the Tokyo MOU during six years was General cargo ships that accounted for 
36.5 percent (15,786) of the total of 43,233 deficiencies as shown in Figure 12. The type’s 
deficiencies peaked at the interval of 5-10 years after 2013 and the range of 5-30 years was 
rising after 2013, compared to those of pre-implementing the MLC. Bulk carriers with 29.9 
percent of total deficiencies peaked their deficiencies at the same interval of General cargo 
ships and declined as a ship’s age was getting older. The type had bigger deficiencies in the 
range of less than 25 years after 2013 than before 2013. Containerships, Chemical tankers 
and Oil tankers with 12.0, 5.4 and 5.0 percent of total deficiencies respectively had a similar 
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trend to Bulk carriers. For the distribution of deficiencies by nine age groups, the highest 
group was 5-10 years with 22.7 percent and a range of less than 30 years accounting for 90 
percent of total deficiencies.  
 
 
Figure 12  The deficiencies of the Tokyo MOU by ship type-age 
 
96.0 percent of the deficiencies of General cargo ships positioned in three intervals of 
500-20,000 tons among six intervals of gross tonnage and the type’s deficiencies were 
increasing until 50,000 tons after 2013 compared to those of before 2013 as shown in Figure 
13. Bulk carrier’s deficiencies were concentrated at the interval of 20,000-50,000 tons and 
increased for more than 500 tons after 2013, compared to those of before 2013.  
 
 
Figure 13  The deficiencies of the Tokyo MOU by ship type-gross tonnage 
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Containerships had the most deficiencies for 5,000 tons and above and their deficiencies 
were rising at the range of 500 tons and above after 2013, which was a similar trend to 
Chemical tankers and Oil tankers. 
93.0 percent of deficiencies were concentrated in the range of less than 30 years. The 
deficiencies of less than 5 years peaked at the interval of 20,000-50,000 tons and were 
increasing at the intervals of less than 500 tons and 20,000 tons and above as shown in 
Figure 14. The deficiencies of the 5-10 year group were the largest with 22.7 percent among 
nine groups of ages, which peaked at the interval of 5,000-20,000 tons and were increasing 
at all the intervals after 2013. The deficiencies of 10-15 years peaked at the interval of 
20,000-50,000 tons and were increasing at all intervals after 2013. The deficiencies of 15-20 
years peaked at the interval of 5,000- 20,000 tons and were decreasing only at the intervals 
of 500-2,000 tons after 2013. The 20-25 year deficiencies peaked at the interval of 500-
2,000 tons and increased until 2,000 tons, which was the same trend as the 25-30 year 
deficiencies. The 30-35 year group accounted for 5.0 percent of the total deficiencies and 
peaked at the interval of 5,000-20,000 tons. The deficiencies of 35 years and above 
accounted for only 2.0 percent of the total deficiencies. 
 
 
Figure 14  The deficiencies of the Tokyo MOU by gross tonnage-age 
 
The major deficiencies of General cargo ships were deficiency codes of 1308, 9232, 
9223, 9227 and 1220 as shown in Figure 15. Among them, the code 1308 surged 5.95 times 
from 239 deficiencies during 2010-2012 to 1,422 deficiencies during 2014-2016 while code 
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
before post before post before post before post before post before post
under 500 500-2000 2000-5000 5000-20000 20000-50000 over 50000
under 5
5-10
10-15
15-20
20-25
25-30
30-35
35-40
0ver 40
 
 
38 
 
9232 dropped 3.05 times from 1,021 before 2013 to 335 deficiencies after 2013. The top 
three deficiencies of Bulk carriers were the same as those of General cargo ships, which 
were followed by codes 18408 and 9298. The major deficiencies of Containerships were 
codes 9232, 1308, 9209, 1220 and 9223. Chemical tankers had major deficiencies for codes  
1308, 9219, 9298, 9211 and 9203 while Oil tankers were mainly highlighted for codes 1220, 
1308, 9203, 9219 (Pipes, wires of insulation) and 9223.  
 
 
Figure 15  The deficiencies of the Tokyo MOU by ship type-deficiency code 
 
 Analysis of the detentions of the Tokyo MOU 
The number of detentions for General cargo ships accounted for 42.0 percent of total 
detentions in the MOU and was fluctuating but generally increasing until 30 years as a ship’s 
age got older as shown in Figure 16. The range of 5-20 years had larger detentions during 
2014-2016 than during 2010-2012. The second largest type was Bulk carriers with 1,768 
detentions (29.2 percent), which was increasing until 20 years old. The detentions of the 
type were distributed evenly over the range of 0-30 years. 74.3 percent of Containership 
detentions were concentrated in the range of 5-20 years. Chemical tankers having 3.8 
percent of the total detentions had fewer detentions, except for the interval of 5-10 years, 
after 2013 than before 2013 while Oil tankers had a greater figure up to 25 years after 2013. 
Refrigerated cargo ships and RO-RO cargo ships shared their deficiencies with 2.99 and 
2.15 percent of total deficiencies and 3.18 and 1.90 percent of total detentions respectively.  
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Figure 16  The detentions of the Tokyo MOU by ship type-age 
 
About 40.2 percent of the detentions for General cargo ships were recorded at the 
interval of 2,000-5,000 gross tonnage as shown in Figure 17. The type’s detentions were 
rising up to 5,000 tons after 2013 compared to before 2013. The detentions for Bulk carriers 
were increasing after 2013 compared to those of before 2013 and were concentrated in the 
range of 5,000-50,000 tons with 78.5 percent. The detentions of Containers were not 
significantly changed before and after 2013 and their range of 5,000-50,000 tons accounted 
for 69.0 percent of their detentions. The interval of 2,000-5,000 tons of Chemical tankers 
shared 44.8 percent of their detentions that were generally decreasing after 2013 while Oil 
tankers generally showed an even spread over the tonnages and increased after 2013.  
 
 
Figure 17  The detentions of the Tokyo MOU by ship type-gross tonnage 
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Each group of less than 30 year old ships shared from 11.6 to 18.8 percent of detentions 
as shown in Figure 18. The detentions of less than five years was increasing at the intervals 
of less than 500 gross tons and 20000 tons and above after 2013. The 5-10 year detentions 
were increasing over the tonnage intervals after 2013 and peaked at the interval of 200-
5,000 tons. The 10-15 year detentions peaked at the interval of 20,000-50,000 tons and the 
change before and after 2013 fluctuated over the tonnages. The 15-20 year detentions 
peaked at the interval of 5,000-20,000 tons and increased in the range of 2,000-50,000 tons 
after 2013. The detentions of 20-25 and 25-30 years peaked at the interval of 500-2,000 tons 
and generally decreased after 2013. The 30-35 year detentions peaked 5,000-20,000 tons 
and were increasing until 5,000 tons after 2013. The detentions of 35 years and above 
accounted for 2.2 percent of the total detentions and occurred less than 50,000 tons. 
 
 
Figure 18  The detentions of the Tokyo MOU by gross tonnage-age 
 
The greatest detention item for General cargo ships was deficiency code 9232 with 268 
detentions followed by the codes of 1308, 9223, 9203, 9229 as shown in Figure 19. These 
codes, except for 1308, were decreasing detentions after 2013. The major deficiency codes 
of Bulk carrier detentions were 1308, 9298, 9232, 18408 and 9223, which had the same 
trend of post-period as General cargo ships. The codes of 9232, 1308, 9223, 9298 and 
18408 were the main detainable items for Containers. For Chemical tanker, the major 
detentions were the codes of 9219, 9298, 9211, 9204 and 9232, of which the last two codes 
marked zero after 2013. Oil tankers were mainly detained by codes 1220, 9232, 1308, 
18299 (other for conditions of employment) and 9219.  
 
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
before post before post before post before post before post before post
under 500 500-2000 2000-5000 5000-20000 20000-50000 over 50000
under 5
5-10
10-15
15-20
20-25
25-30
30-35
35-40
0ver 40
 
 
41 
 
 
Figure 19  The detentions of the Tokyo MOU by ship type-deficiency code 
 
5.4 Discussion 
 
For the three-years after implementation of the MLC, 15,593 deficiencies with an 
average number of 205.17 for all deficiency codes in the Paris MoU and 16,546 deficiencies 
with an average of 201.78 in the Tokyo MOU were identified in both ILO Conventions. For 
the relation to national discretion granted by the MLC, the Paris MoU recorded in total 2,492 
deficiencies with an average of 178.00 per individual deficiency codes and the Tokyo MOU 
marked 4,737 deficiencies with an average of 263.17 as shown in Table 8. If the figures are 
calculated by each number of deficiency codes, considering that several clauses on the 
national discretions were duplicated to one deficiency code, the revised average was down 
to 113.27 in the Paris MoU and 175.44 in the Tokyo MOU, which is 55.2 percent to the 
average for all deficiency codes and 86.9 percent in the Tokyo MOU as mentioned in the first 
hypothesis.  
Although it is not easy to say that the above figures give a perfect correlation between 
the lower deficiencies and PSC officers’ behavior by the drawback of the regulations in terms 
of PSC, as mentioned in 3.4, it is more reasonable to believe that PSC Officers will have 
difficulty in confirming flag states’ regulations within a limited time and that it will cause 
passive inspection in the areas.  
There were 17 deficiency codes in both of the MOUs’ top 30 detainable deficiencies17 as 
shown in Figure 1 and 11.  These codes could be assumed as an indicator for weaker areas 
                                               
17  Code 9232, 9203, 1220, 9106, 9298, 9229, 9204, 9227, 9228, 9223, 18408, 18416, 18302, 18203, 
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for ships to implement the MLC and ILO No. 147 Convention. For instance, the Paris MoU 
presents its key performance indicators (KPIs) by the number of inspections, inspections 
with deficiencies, deficiencies, detainable deficiencies, detentions and ISM deficiencies 
(Paris MoU, 2017c).     
For the accommodation and recreational facilities through Regulation 3.1 of the MLC, 
each deficiency code from 18301 to 18311 was marked less than 1.03 percent of the total 
deficiencies during 2014-2016, except for code 18302 having 4.41 percent in Paris MoU and 
2.47 percent in Tokyo MOU both recorded above the average. The outcome seems to be 
reflected by the fact that the Regulation applies to new ships constructed after August 2013, 
regardless of a major conversion. This means existing ships do not apply to the regulation 
even if the ship undertakes a major conversion after 2013, which is not the same approach 
as IMO Conventions. 
As the MLC includes ILO No. 147 Convention, most deficiencies of both the Conventions 
are the same nature with a different deficiency code. For example, the deficiency code for 
personal equipment is 9216 for the latter Convention while 18412 is for the former one. 
Although this paper analyzes the basis of the deficiency code without incorporating the same 
nature of deficiency, several codes showed significant change between the pre- and post-
implementing the MLC.  Generally the codes of Table 5 for ILO No. 147 Convention were 
decreasing after 2013 while the ones in Table 6 for the MLC were increasing. Also the 
deficiencies and detentions in the Tokyo MOU were increasing over ship ages and sizes 
after 2013. Especially, the number of deficiency code 1308 for the records of rest in the 
Tokyo MOU after 2013 jumped up 4.94 times and that of detention also increased 2.04 times 
during the period.   
After implementing the MLC, the deficiencies for the Convention were rising more than 
20.7 percent annually during the three years in both MOUs. However, the number of 
deficiencies and detentions for each item were not the same. The deficiencies in the Paris 
MoU during 2010-2012 accounted for 54.8 percent, which was greater than 45.2 percent for 
2014-2016, while the Tokyo MOU had a larger figure of 63.2 percent after 2013 than before 
2013. This means the number of deficiencies in the Tokyo MOU after 2013 increased by 
71.84 percent compared to before 2013. While the detention of both MOUs for the post-
implementation of the MLC recorded larger numbers with 51.5 and 54.7 percent respectively 
than before 2013. Even though the number of Paris MoU’s deficiencies in the areas 
decreased, increasing detentions  of both MOUs shows that they had placed stricter 
enforcement on seafarers’ living and working environments after implementing the MLC. 
Especially, code 18203 (wages) recorded 52.0 percent of the highest detention rates to 
deficiencies in Paris MoU and the second with 31.0 percent in the Tokyo MOU.       
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It is also noted that the deficiencies and detentions related to the MLC rather than ILO 
No. 147 Convention were increasing after 2013 compared to those of before 2013. For 
instance, the detentions in the Tokyo MOU decreased for the deficiency codes of 9232, 9298, 
9299 (Other for mooring), 9223, 9227, 9228 (Anchoring devices), 9229 (Winches/capstans) 
and 9203 after 2013 while the codes of 1308, 1220 and new deficiency groups for the MLC 
were increasing after 2013. From other analyses on ship type, tonnage and age in 5.2 and 
5.3, different outcomes of deficiencies and detentions were presented. For example, the 
deficiency and detention rates of General cargo ships were 44.8 and 56.2 percent in the 
Paris MoU while they marked 36.5 and 40.2 percent in the Tokyo MOU respectively. Another 
example is that the largest ship types in the Tokyo MOU were General cargo ships, Bulk 
carriers, Containerships, Chemical tankers and Oil tankers in order while RO-RO cargo 
ships were positioned in the fourth for the highest detention types and the fifth for the highest 
deficiencies in the Paris MoU. Meanwhile, RO-RO cargo ships in the Tokyo MOU ranked the 
seventh largest ship types having their share of 2.15 percent of deficiencies and 1.90 
percent of the total detentions.  
One of the reasons of having the above differences between two regions can be 
explained by the number of the contracting governments to the MLC and ILO No. 147 
Convention. As shown in Table 9, all 27 member authorities of the Paris MoU are contracting 
governments to the latter Convention and its 26 authorities are ones to the MLC while, 
among 20 full member authorities of the Tokyo MOU, only five and 14 members are 
contracting governments to the ILO No. 147 and the MLC respectively. Another reason is 
assumed that the characteristics of calling vessels in the region were diverse as its main 
trading commodities are different from each MOU  
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 CONCLUSION 
 
The aims of this paper were to examine the difference of legal grounds for PSC among 
the Conventions under the auspices of the IMO and ILO and investigate what influenced the 
MLC towards the shipping industry. This dissertation has focused on finding out the weak 
areas of seafarers’ living and working environments of the MLC and ILO No. 147 Convention 
related to the PSC data conducted by the Paris MoU and the Tokyo MOU during 2010-2012 
and 2014-2016, which were the periods before and after three-years of the year of entering 
into force of the MLC.  
This study describes the background of the IMO and ILO Conventions, the legal grounds 
of PSC and the development of PSC regional cooperation schemes. The brief background of 
adopting the MLC, its main figures, implementing PSC and shortcomings in terms of 
conducting PSC were also provided. Additionally, the analysis on the correlation among 
ship’s type, age, gross tonnage, nature of deficiency and detention was conducted for 
88,812 deficiency records of both MOUs on seafarers’ living and working conditions during 
six years.  
The study explains that most ILO Conventions, even though they are evaluated to 
contributing to increase the level of seafarers’ labor conditions, had not greatly impacted on 
the shipping industry as much as IMO Conventions. Since the Conventions, unlikely IMO 
Conventions, do not provide any legal grounds of PSC with NMFT in order to control foreign 
vessels for their implementation. Even the ILO No. 147 Convention, when compared to IMO 
Conventions, is considered to conduct “passive” PSC inspection that could inspect when 
receiving seafarers’ complaints or obtaining evidence. However, to overcome the limitation 
of the ILO Conventions and achieve decent seafarer labor conditions, the MLC was adopted 
with borrowing complementary articles from the IMO Conventions that were evaluated as an 
“innovational measure” in respect to the ILO Conventions.  
Meanwhile, the flexibility granting national discretion by the MLC could lead PSC officers 
to inspect reluctantly, because PSC officers have some limitations to obtain the information 
of each national regulation within their inspection time. From the analysis, the deficiency 
codes related to national discretions also show lower figures than the average deficiencies of 
post-implementing the MLC, as shown in Table 8. 
The analysis compared the data of both MOUs by the relationship with ship type, age, 
gross tonnage, deficiency and detention for the three years, which could be a good indicator 
for implementing the MLC by the shipping industry like the KPIs of the Paris MoU. The study 
reveals that the deficiencies of the Tokyo MOU increased by 71.8 percent in the three years 
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of 2014-2016, compared to those of before 2013, while the ones of the Paris MoU were 
slightly decreasing during the same periods. However, the number of detentions on the 
issues was increasing in both MOUs. This implies that the shipping industry operating in the 
Tokyo MOU region was much more affected by the MLC rather than that of Paris MoU. 
Unlikely most IMO Conventions, ship construction in the case of having been major 
conversion has not been affected by the MLC. As mentioned in 3.2, even if an existing ship 
undertakes major conversions after 2013, the requirements of the MLC do not apply to the 
ship according to Regulation 3.1 on the construction of accommodation facilities by the MLC. 
While most member authorities of the Paris MoU were contracting governments to both 
Conventions, the Tokyo MOU members were changed from 5 for the ILO No. 147 
Convention to 14 for the MLC. This difference with trading commodities in both regions could 
affect the PSC outcome of both MOUs. Its typical example is that the number of deficiencies 
in the Tokyo MOU during 2014-2016 increased by 71.84 percent compared to 2010-2012. 
The number of detentions during 2014-2016 was also rising from 4,177 to 4,430 in the Paris 
MoU and from 2,736 to 3,310 in the Tokyo MOU. Another example of the difference in both 
regions is different trend and share for ship’s type. General cargo ships, the largest ship type 
in both regions, marked 44.8 percent of deficiencies and 56.2 percent of detentions in the 
Paris MoU, which were higher by 8.3 and 16.0 percent than those of the Tokyo MOU. 
Additionally, RO-RO cargo ships ranked fourth for the highest detentions type and fifth for 
the highest deficiencies in the Paris MoU while it positioned only seventh in the Tokyo MOU. 
Similar examples can be found in other areas of correlation among ship’s age, size, nature 
of deficiency and detention. 
The MLC incorporating the ILO No. 147 Convention has four deficiency coding groups, 
two of which are similar deficiency codes. During 2014-2016, the number of the deficiencies 
for the ILO No. 147 Convention was decreasing while that of the MLC was increasing. 
Especially, the deficiency code 1308 on the records of seafarers’ rest ranked top with 8.05 
percent of total deficiencies and with 11.15 percent of detentions during 2014-2016.  
From the results of the analysis, it could reach a conclusion that the MLC supported by 
the “police power” of PSC would bring positive effects to the improvement of seafarers’ living 
and working conditions, which will consequently contribute to the safety of the ship. However, 
the author believes that certain improvements/clarifications to get a better outcome from the 
MLC are needed. The first suggestion is that more clear guidelines or interpretations for the 
regulations allowing national discretions should be given to PSC officers, as the IMO 
presents unified interpretations for vague expressions in its Conventions. Excessive national 
discretion seems a kind of shortcoming of the Convention in terms of conducting PSC, 
because PSC is conducted on the basis of international standards, not national rules. 
Furthermore, there could be a negative impact on the fair competition among shipping 
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companies and flag states by allowing setting lower standards than generally internationally 
accepted ones.     
Another suggestion is that the deficiency codes on several Regulations should be 
developed. The Regulations 2.4, 2.5, 2.6 and 4.5 of the MLC on seafarer’s leave, 
repatriation, compensation for ship’s loss or foundering and social security are not listed in 
the Coding system of both MOUs. Even though these Regulations seem to apply to 
seafarers getting off a ship, port states might tank a chance to investigate these issues by 
the onshore seafarer complaint procedure according to Regulation 5.2.2 of the Convention. 
This study was limited to examine the impact of the MLC by using the analysis of PSC 
data of both MOUs considering the time pressure and data availability. The analysis was 
only carried out through a broad approach on several factors such as ship type, age and size. 
Hence, it is worthy to undertake further studies on how the MLC affects seafarers’ real life 
through the survey considering the Convention could play a vital role in preventing maritime 
accident by upgrading seafarers’ living and working conditions.  
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 APPENDICES (Tables) 
 
Table 1 National discretion clauses in MLC 
MLC 
Standards 
Requirement / Content 
Deficiency 
Code 
A1.1.2 Definition of Night 1139  
A1.1.4 Type of prohibited work 1140  
A1.4.3(c) National Reg. to authorize collective bargaining agreement 1140  
A1.4.6 Licences for private service operation in recruitment for authority 
A2.1.3 The form (content) of Seafarer employment document  1220  
A2.1.4 The contents of Seafarer employment agreement  1329  
A2.1.6 Shortening notice period for termination of employment 1330  
A2.2.5 Charge for transmitting wages 18102  
A2.3.4 Hours of work and rest 18104  
A2.3.7 Musters and drills exempted from hours of rest 18199  
A2.3.10(b) Poster on hours of work and rest 18199  
A2.4.1 Annual leave standards 18201  
A2.4.2 Annual leave length 18201  
A2.5.3 Recovering the cost of repatriation 18202  
A2.5.4 Shipowner’s right to recover the cost of repatriation 18205  
A2.6.2 Seafarer compensation for ship ‘s loss 18299  
A3.1.1 Minimum standards for accommodation 18299  
A4.1.1(d) Medical care and health protection service  18299  
A4.1.4(a) Medical chest, medical equipment and guide 18299  
A4.1.4(b) Medical doctor for international passengerships 18299  
A4.1.4(c) Personnel for medical first aid 18299  
A4.2.1(b) Financial security for occupation injury 18399  
A4.2.2 Limiting shipowner’s liability for medical care 18401  
A4.2.3 Paying wages during sickness or injury in work 18404  
A4.2.4 Limiting shipowner’s liability for incapable seafarer  18404  
A4.2.5 
Excluding shipowner’s liability for willful misconduct of sick, 
injured or deceased seafarer  
18406  
A4.2.6 
exempting shipowner’s liability covered by other public 
authority 
18427  
R4.3.3 and 
A4.3 
Standards for occupational safety and health protection and 
accident prevention 
18499  
A4.5.1 Comprehensive social security protection for authority 
A4.5.3 Complementary social security protection for authority 
A5.1.2.3(a) Oversight system for RO for authority 
A5.1.3.1 Inspection items for maritime labour certificate for authority 
A5.1.3.2 Validity of maritime labour certificate for authority 
A5.1.3.10 Declaration of maritime labour compliance for authority 
A5.1.3.11 Record of deficiencies during inspection for authority 
A5.1.3.12 Copy of MLC and DMLC for authority 
A5.1.4.16 Compensation for unreasonable detain for authority 
A5.1.5.1 On-board complaint procedures for authority 
(Source: compiled by author) 
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Table 2  The ratification status of the consolidated conventions to MLC 
Conventions Date of entry 
into force 
No. of 
ratification 
Effective 
ratification. 
Minimum Age (Sea) Convention, 1920 (No. 7) Sep.27 1921 53 2 
Unemployment Indemnity (Shipwreck) Convention, 1920 (No. 8) Mar.16 1923 60 2 
Placing of Seamen Convention, 1920 (No. 9) Nov.23 1921 41 2 
Medical Examination of Young Persons (Sea) Convention, 1921 
(No. 16) 
Nov.20 1922 82 2 
Seamen's Articles of Agreement Convention, 1926 (No. 22) Apr.4 1928 60 2 
Repatriation of Seamen Convention, 1926 (No. 23) Apr.18 1928 47 2 
Officers' Competency Certificates Convention, 1936 (No. 53) Mar.29 1939 37 2 
Holidays with Pay (Sea) Convention, 1936 (No. 54) - 6 5 
Shipowners' Liability (Sick and Injured Seamen) Convention, 
1936 (No. 55) 
Oct.29 1939 18 2 
Sickness Insurance (Sea) Convention, 1936 (No. 56) Dec.9 1949 20 2 
Hours of Work and Manning (Sea) Convention, 1936 (No. 57) - 3 5 
Minimum Age (Sea) Convention (Revised), 1936 (No. 58) Apr.11 1949 51 2 
Food and Catering (Ships' Crews) Convention, 1946 (No. 68) Mar.24 1957 25 9 
Certification of Ships' Cooks Convention, 1946 (No. 69) Apr.22 1953 38 9 
Social Security (Seafarers) Convention, 1946 (No. 70) - 7 7 
Paid Vacations (Seafarers) Convention, 1946 (No. 72) - 5 9 
Medical Examination (Seafarers) Convention, 1946 (No. 73) Aug.17 1955 46 7 
Certification of Able Seamen Convention, 1946 (No. 74) Jul.14 1951 29 2 
Accommodation of Crews Convention, 1946 (No. 75) - 5 7 
Wages, Hours of Work and Manning (Sea) Convention, 1946 
(No. 76) 
- 0 9 
Paid Vacations (Seafarers) Convention (Revised), 1949 (No. 91) Sep.14 1967 25 9 
Accommodation of Crews Convention (Revised), 1949 (No. 92) Jan.29 1953 47 7 
Wages, Hours of Work and Manning (Sea) Convention 
(Revised), 1949 (No. 93) 
- 5 9 
Wages, Hours of Work and Manning (Sea) Convention 
(Revised), 1958 (No. 109) 
- 15 9 
Accommodation of Crews (Supplementary Provisions) 
Convention, 1970 (No. 133) 
Aug.27 1991 32 12 
Prevention of Accidents (Seafarers) Convention, 1970 (No. 134) Feb.17 1973 29 2 
Continuity of Employment (Seafarers) Convention, 1976 (No. 
145) 
Mar.3 1979 17 2 
Seafarers' Annual Leave with Pay Convention, 1976 (No. 146) Jun.13 1979 17 2 
Merchant Shipping (Minimum Standards) Convention, 1976 (No. 
147) 
Nov.28 1981 56 10 
Protocol of 1996 to the Merchant Shipping (Minimum Standards) 
Convention, 1976 (No. 147) 
Jul.10 2003 24 5 
Seafarers' Welfare Convention, 1987 (No. 163) Jan.11 1991 15 2 
Health Protection and Medical Care (Seafarers) Convention, 
1987 (No. 164) 
Jan.11 1991 15 2 
Social Security (Seafarers) Convention (Revised), 1987 (No. 
165) 
Jul.2 1992 3 2 
Repatriation of Seafarers Convention (Revised), 1987 (No. 166) Jul.3. 1991 14 2 
Labour Inspection (Seafarers) Convention, 1996 (No. 178) Apr.22 2000 15 2 
Recruitment and Placement of Seafarers Convention, 1996 (No. 
179) 
Apr.22 2000 10 2 
Seafarers' Hours of Work and the Manning of Ships Convention, 
1996 (No. 180) 
Aug.2002 21 5 
(Source: compiled by the author by using the NORMLEX of ILO web site) 
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Table 3  The trend of deficiencies on ILO No. 147 and MLC by both MOUs per year18 
Year 2010 2011 2012 2014 2015 2016 Total 
Paris MoU 10,271 7,470 7,240 7,234 6,634 6,730 45,579 
Tokyo MOU 4,676 5,405 5,823 10,140 8,520 8,669 43,233 
Total 14,947 12,875 13,063 17,374 15,154 15,399 88,812 
 
Table 4  Deficiency code group of the Paris MoU and Tokyo MOU 
Paris MoU Detective item Tokyo MOU 
011 Certificate and Documentation - Ship Certificates 011 
012 Certificate and Documentation - Crew Certificates 012 
013 Certificate and Documentation – Documents 013 
021 Structural Conditions 021 
031 Water/Weathertight conditions 031 
041 Emergency Systems 041 
051 Radio Communications 051 
061 Cargo operations including equipment 061 
071 Fire safety 071 
081 Alarms 081 
091 Living and Working Conditions - Living Conditions 091 
092 Living and Working Conditions - Working Conditions 092 
101 Safety of Navigation 101 
111 Lifesaving appliances 111 
121 Dangerous goods 121 
131 Propulsion and auxiliary machinery 131 
141 Pollution prevention - MARPOL Annex I 141 
142 Pollution prevention - MARPOL Annex II 142 
143 Pollution prevention - MARPOL Annex III 143 
144 Pollution prevention - MARPOL Annex IV 144 
145 Pollution prevention - MARPOL Annex V 145 
146 Pollution prevention - MARPOL Annex VI 146 
147 Pollution prevention - Anti Fouling 147 
15 ISM 15 
16 ISPS  16 
181 Labour Conditions-Minimum requirements for seafarers 181 
182 Labour Conditions-Conditions of employment 182 
183 
Labour Conditions-Accommodation, recreational facilities, food 
and catering 
183 
184 Labour Conditions-Health protection, medical care, social security 184 
991 Other 991 
(Source: compiled by the author from the Coding system of both MOUs) 
                                               
18 The number of deficiencies differed from that of its Annual Report. It seems the differences 
between both figures are caused by amending the coding system, which led to the changing the 
codes of some deficiencies. 
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Table 5  Deficiency codes for ILO No. 147 Convention by both MOUs 
091 - Living and Working Conditions - Living 
Conditions 
092 - Living and Working Conditions - 
Working Conditions 
09101 – Minimum age 09201 - Ventilation (Working spaces) 
09102 - Dirty, parasites 09202 – Heating 
09103 - Ventilation (Accommodation)  09203 - Lighting (Working spaces) 
09104 – Heating 09204 - Safe means of access 
09105 – Noise 09205 - Safe means of access Shore – Ship 
09106 - Sanitary Facilities 09206 - Safe means of access Deck - hold/tank, etc. 
09107 – Drainage 09207 - Obstruction/slipping, etc. 
09108 - Lighting (Accommodation) 09208 - Protection machinery 
09109 - Pipes, wires (insulation) 09209 – Electrical 
09110 - Electrical devices 09210 – Machinery 
09111 – Sickbay 09211 - Steam pipes and pressure pipes 
09112 - Medical Equipment  09212 - Danger areas 
09113 - Access/structure 09213 - Gas instruments 
09114 - Sleeping room 09214 - Emergency cleaning devices 
09115 – No direct openings into sleeping rooms 
cargo/mach. 
09216 - Personal equipment 
09116 – Furnishings 09217 - Warning notices 
09117 - Berth dimensions, etc. 09218 - Protection machines/parts 
09118 – Clear head 09219 - Pipes, wires (insulation) 
09119 - Messroom (location) 09220 - Structural features (ship) 
09120 - Clothes locker 09221 - Entry dangerous spaces 
09121 – Laundry 09223 - Gangway, accommodation-ladder 
09122 – Record of inspection (Accommodation) 09224 - Stowage of cargo 
09124 - Galley, handlingroom (maintenance) 09225 - Loading and unloading equipment 
09127 – Cleanliness 09226 - Holds and tanks safety 
09128 – Provisions quantity 09227 - Ropes and wires 
09129 - Provisions quality 09228 - Anchoring devices 
09130 - Water, pipes, tanks 09229 - Winches & capstans 
09131 - Cold room 09230 - Adequate lighting - mooring arrangements 
09132 - Cold room temperature 09232 - Cleanliness of engine room 
09133 - Cold room cleanliness 
09233 - Guards - fencing around dangerous 
machinery parts 
09134 - Food personal hygiene 
09234 – Night working for seafarer under the age of 
18 
09135 - Food temperature 09235 - Fitness for duty - work and rest hours 
09136 – Food segregation  09236 - Legal documentation on work and rest hours 
09137 - Record of inspection 09237 – Fitness for duty – intoxication 
09198 - Other (crew and accommodation) 09297 - Other (working space ILO) 
09199 - Other (food) 09298 - Other (accident prevention) 
 09299 - Other (mooring) 
(Source: compiled by the author from the Coding system of the Paris MoU and Tokyo MOU) 
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Table 6  Deficiency codes for MLC by both MOUs 
181 - Labour Conditions-Minimum 
requirements for seafarers 
184 - Labour Conditions-Health protection, 
medical care, social security 
18101 – Minimum age 
18401 - Medical Equipment, medical chest, 
medical guide 
18102 – Night working 
18402 - Access to on shore medical doctor or 
dentist 
18103 - Medical fitness 18403 - Standard medical report form 
18104 - Recruitment and placement service 
18404 - Medical doctor or person in charge of 
medical care 
18199 - Other (Minimum requirements) 18405 - Medical advice by radio or satellite 
182 - Labour Conditions-Conditions of 
employment 
18406 - Medical care onboard or ashore free of 
charge 
18201 - Fitness for duty - work and rest hours 18407 - Lighting (Working spaces) 
18202 - Legal documentation on work and rest 
hours 
18408 – Electrical 
18203 – Wages 18409 - Dangerous areas 
18204 - Calculation and payment of wages 18410 - Gas instruments 
18205 - Measures to ensure transmission to 
seafarer's family 
18411 - Emergency cleaning devices 
18299 - Other (Conditions of employment) 18412 - Personal equipment 
183 - Labour Conditions-Accommodation, 
recreational facilities, food and catering 
18413 - Warning notices 
18301 - Noise, vibration and other ambient 
factors 
18414 - Protection machines/parts 
18302 - Sanitary Facilities 18415 - Entry dangerous spaces 
18303 – Drainage 18416 - Ropes and wires 
18304 - Lighting (Accommodation) 18417 - Anchoring devices 
18305 - Hospital accommodation (Sickbay) 18418 - Winches & capstans 
18306 - Sleeping room, additional spaces 
18419 - Adequate lighting - mooring 
arrangements 
18307 - No direct openings into sleeping rooms 
cargo/mach. 
18420 - Cleanliness of engine room 
18308 – Furnishings 
18421 - Guards - fencing around dangerous 
machinery parts 
18309 – Berth dimensions, etc. 18422 – Asbestos fibers 
18310 – Minimum headroom 18423 - Preventative information 
18311 - Messroom and recreational facilities 
18424 - Steam pipes, pressure pipes, wires 
(insulation) 
18312 - Galley, handlingroom (maintenance) 18425 - Access / structural features (ship) 
18313 – Cleanliness 
18426 - Exposure to harmful levels of ambient 
factors 
18314 - Provisions quantity 
18427 - Ship's occupational safety and health 
policies and programmes 
18315 - Provisions quality and nutritional value 
18428 - On board programme for the prevention 
of occupational injuries and diseases 
18316 - Water, pipes, tanks 
18429 - Procedure for inspection, reporting and 
correcting unsafe conditions and for 
investigating and reporting on-board 
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occupational accidents 
18317 - Food personal hygiene 18430 - Ship’s safety committee 
18318 - Food temperature 18431 - Investigation after accident 
18319 - Food segregation 
18432 - Risk evaluation, training and instruction 
to seafarers 
18320 - Record of inspection (food and catering) 
18499 - Other (Health protection, medical 
care…) 
18321 - Heating, air conditioning and ventilation  
18322 – Insulation  
18323 – Office  
18324 - Cold room, cold room cleanliness, cold 
room temperature 
 
18325 - Training and qualification of ship’s cook  
18326 - Laundry, Adequate Locker  
18327 - Ventilation (Working spaces)  
18328 - Record of inspection  
18399 - Other (Accommodation, recreational 
facilities…) 
 
(Source: compiled by the author from the Coding system of the Paris MoU and Tokyo MOU) 
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Table 7  Overview of PSC inspections by both MOUs 
Paris MOU 2010 2011 2012 2014 2015 2016 Average 
Number of inspections 24,058  19,058  18,308  18,430  17,858  17,828  19,257 
Number of detentions 790  688  669  612  595  675  672 
Number of 
deficiencies 
64,698  50,738  49,261  45,979  41,436  41,698  48,968 
Detention % of 
inspections 
3.28  3.61  3.65  3.32  3.33  3.79  3.50  
No. of deficiencies for 
ILO No. 147 
9,989  7,565  7,249  2,954  1,164  974  4,983 
No. of deficiencies for 
MLC 2006  
      3,951  5,002  5,756  4,903 
Title 1       57  62  120  80 
Title 2       324  393  542  420 
Title 3       1,352  1,752  2,038  1,714 
Title 4       2,218  2,795  3,056  2,690 
No. of detentions for 
MLC and ILO No. 147 
1,685 1,280 1,212 1,539 1,396 1,495 1,435 
Detention percentage 
to deficiencies for 
MLC and ILO No. 147  
16.87  16.92  16.72  22.29  22.64  22.21  19.61  
Tokyo MOU 2010 2011 2012 2014 2015 2016 Average 
Number of inspections 25,762  28,627  30,929  30,405  31,407  31,678  29,801 
Number of detentions 1,411  1,562  1,421  1,203  1,153  1,090  1,307 
No. of deficiencies 
(incl. ISPS) 
92,927  106,482  102,820  91,175  84,995  82,895  93,549 
Detention % of 
inspections 
5.48  5.46  4.59  3.96  3.67  3.44  4.43  
No. of deficiencies for 
ILO No. 147 
2,990  3,411  5,168  4,663  3,215  2,904  3,725 
No. of deficiencies for 
MLC 2006 
      2,437  3,247  3,718  3,134 
Title 1       74  35  38  49 
Title 2       363  515  483  454 
Title 3       1,017  998  1,025  1,013 
Title 4       983  1,699  2,172  1,618 
No. of detentions for 
MLC and ILO No. 147 
831 1,015 890 1,301 1,045 964 1,008 
Detention percentage 
to deficiencies for 
MLC and ILO No. 147  
27.79  29.76  17.22  18.32  16.17  14.56  20.64  
(Source: compiled by the author from the Annual Reports during 2010-2016 of the Paris 
MoU and Tokyo MOU) 
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Table 8 The deficiencies of both MOUs on National discretion of the MLC related to 
Table 1 
MLC 
Standards 
Deficiency 
Code 
Paris MoU 
No. of Def. 
Paris MoU 
share of Def. 
Tokyo MOU 
No. of Def. 
Tokyo MOU  
share of Def. 
A1.1.2 1139      503 3.040  
A1.1.4 1140      
313 1.892  
A1.4.3(c) 1140      
A1.4.6 for authority         
A2.1.3 1220  465 2.982  1326 8.014  
A2.1.4 1329      10 0.060  
A2.1.6 1330      463 2.798  
A2.2.5 18102  2 0.013  3 0.018  
A2.3.4 18104  74 0.475  76 0.459  
A2.3.7 18199  
30 0.192  40 0.242  
A2.3.10(b) 18199  
A2.4.1 18201  
269 1.725  302 1.825  
A2.4.2 18201  
A2.5.3 18202  191 1.225  443 2.677  
A2.5.4 18205  13 0.083  4 0.024  
A2.6.2 18299  
248 1.590  277 1.674  
A3.1.1 18299  
A4.1.1(d) 18299  
A4.1.4(a) 18299  
A4.1.4(b) 18299  
A4.1.4(c) 18299  
A4.2.1(b) 18399  152 0.975  237 1.432  
A4.2.2 18401  496 3.181  324 1.958  
A4.2.3 18404  
12 0.077  10 0.060  
A4.2.4 18404  
A4.2.5 18406  3 0.019  4 0.024  
A4.2.6 18427  22 0.141  39 0.236  
A4.3 18499  515 3.303  363 2.194  
A4.5.1 for authority 
    
A4.5.3 for authority 
    
A5.1.2.3(a) for authority 
    
A5.1.3.1 for authority 
    
A5.1.3.2 for authority 
    
A5.1.3.10 for authority 
    
A5.1.3.11 for authority 
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A5.1.3.12 for authority         
A5.1.4.16 for authority         
A5.1.5.1 for authority         
Total for Post-
implementation  
15,593 100.000  16,546 100.000  
Post Average per all Def. 
codes 
205.171  1.316  201.7805 1.220  
Total for Codes of national 
discretion  
2,492  15.982  4,737  28.629  
Post Average per relevant 
Def. codes19 
178.000  1.142  263.167  1.591  
Revised Average per 
relevant Def. codes20 
113.273  0.726  175.444  1.060  
(Source: compiled by the author from the PSC data of both MOUs) 
 
  
                                               
19  Average calculated by the number of individual deficiency codes related to the national discretion 
of the MLC, i.e. Paris MoU is 14 individual deficiency codes and Tokyo MOU is 18.  
20 Revised Average calculated by the each number of deficiency codes, i.e. Paris MoU is 22 
deficiency codes and Tokyo MOU is 27.  
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Table 9 Ratification status of member Authorities of both MOUs for ILO No. 147 and 
MLC Conventions 
Tokyo MOU Paris MoU 
Authority  ILO 147 MLC 2006 Authority  ILO 147 MLC 2006 
Australia  - 2011-12-21 Belgium  1982-09-16 2013-08-20 
  
  
Bulgaria  2003-02-24 2010-04-12 
Canada  1993-05-25 2010-06-15 Canada  1993-05-25 2010-06-15 
Chile  - - Croatia  1996-07-19 2010-02-12 
China  - 2015-11-12 Cyprus  1995-09-19 2012-07-20 
Fiji  - 2013-01-21 Denmark  1980-07-28 2011-06-23 
Hong Kong, 
China 
1980-11-28 - 
Estonia  
2004-12-01 2016-05-05 
Indonesia  - - Finland  1978-10-02 2013-01-09 
Japan  1983-05-31 2013-08-05 France  1978-05-02 2013-02-28 
Republic of 
Korea  
- 2014-01-09 
Germany  
1980-07-14 2013-08-16 
Malaysia  - 2013-08-20 Greece  1979-09-18 2013-01-04 
Marshall Islands  - 2007-09-25 Iceland  1999-05-11 - 
New Zealand  - 2016-03-09 Ireland  1992-12-16 2014-07-21 
Papua New 
Guinea  
- - 
Italy  
1981-06-23 2013-11-19 
Peru  2004-07-06 - Latvia  1998-11-12 2011-08-12 
Philippines  - 2012-08-20 Lithuania  2006-07-14 2013-08-20 
  
  
Malta  2002-01-10 2013-01-22 
  
  
Netherlands  1979-01-25 2011-12-13 
  
  
Norway  1979-01-24 2009-02-10 
  
  
Poland  1995-06-02 2012-05-03 
  
  
Portugal  1985-05-02 2016-05-12 
  
  
Romania  2001-05-15 2015-11-24 
Russian 
Federation  
1991-05-07 2012-08-20 
Russian 
Federation 
1991-05-07 2012-08-20 
Singapore  - 2011-06-15 Slovenia  1999-06-21 2016-04-15 
Thailand  - 2016-06-07 Spain  1978-04-28 2010-02-04 
Vanuatu  - - Sweden  1978-12-20 2012-06-12 
Viet Nam  - 2013-05-08 United Kingdom 1980-11-28 2013-08-07 
Panama  - 2009-02-06   
  
DPR Korea  - -   
  
Macao, China*  - -   
  
Solomon Islands  - -   
  
Tonga  - -   
  
Entry into force 
date  
1981-11-28 2013-08-20 
Entry into force 
date  
1981-11-28 2013-08-20 
(Source: compiled by the author from the ILO’s NORMLEX website and Tokyo MOU’s 2016 
Annual Report) 
 
 
